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INTRODUCTION 
The debate surrounding the teaching of evolution in public 
school science classes is constantly evolving.1  Indeed, the traditional 
context for that debate is no longer sufficient to explain its legal and 
political ramifications.  For decades, arguments and judicial decisions 
about evolution instruction have focused solely on whether different 
approaches to teaching evolution violate the First Amendment’s Es-
tablishment Clause.2  The policy dimension of the debate has recently 
turned toward what this Article describes as a “distributive model” of 
evolution instruction.  This distributive model requires a new analyti-
cal paradigm grounded not solely in the Establishment Clause, but in 
a wider range of principles more commonly associated with adminis-
trative law. 
Religiosity is a defining characteristic of American society and cul-
ture.3  Not surprisingly, then, questions about how to educate our 
 
 1 See On the Media:  Darwin’s in the Details, Interview by Bob Garfield with Eugenie Scott, Ex-
ec. Dir. of the Nat’l Ctr. for Sci. Educ., et. al. (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 3, 
2009) [hereinafter “Darwin’s in the Details”] (statement of Eugenie C. Scott), available at 
http://www.onthemedia.org/transcripts/2009/04/03/01?printable (stating the position 
of evolution opponents is “evolving in response to the legal environment”). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion . . . .”); see, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (striking down Arkan-
sas’s statutory ban on teaching evolution under the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment); Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 763 (M.D. Pa. 
2005) (invalidating use of evolution disclaimer under the Establishment Clause almost 
forty years after Epperson). 
 3 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984) (“There is an unbroken history of 
official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in 
American life from at least 1789.”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (“We are 
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”); Bauchman v. W. 
High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 554 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Courts have long recognized the histori-
cal, social and cultural significance of religion in our lives and in the world, generally.  
Courts also have recognized that ‘a variety of motives and purposes are implicated’ by 
government activity in a pluralistic society.” (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680)); Daniel O. 
Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty:  From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality 
and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 31 (2000) (“[R]eligion not only influences politics 
in the contemporary United States, but . . . religion [is incorporated into] politics to a 
degree that may be unparalleled in the American past.”); Caroline Elizabeth Branch, 
Comment, Unexcused Absence:  Why Public Schools in Religiously Plural Society Must Save a Seat 
for Religion in the Curriculum, 56 EMORY L.J. 1431, 1432 (2007) (“The United States is a so-
ciety of myriad religious practices and perspectives . . . . Communities are expected to 
discuss . . . policies that may implicate religious principles . . . . Such conversations are a 
virtually unavoidable aspect of active political life in the United States.”); id. at 1433 (“Re-
ligion infuses American public life . . . .”).  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, at least 
80% of American adults in 2008 describe themselves as belonging to a religious denomi-
nation other than “Atheist, agnostic, and nothing in particular.”  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
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children frequently include discussions about whether and to what 
degree religious ideas or influences may interact with public educa-
tion.4  The debate regarding how or whether to teach children about 
scientific explanations of human origins on Earth is perhaps the most 
well-recognized and impassioned of those discussions.5  It has become 
 
THE 2010 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 88 tbl.75 (2010), 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010edition.html (follow “1-77” hyperlink). 
 4 A recent and highly controversial issue in this debate involved changes made to the state 
social studies and history curriculum by the Texas State Board of Education.  The 
changes included removing Thomas Jefferson from a list of “influential political philoso-
pher[s] in a world history class,” and an attempt “to water down the rationale for the se-
paration of church and state in a high school government class [by] pointing out that the 
words were not in the Constitution and requiring that students compare and contrast the 
judicial language with the wording in the First Amendment.”  April Castro, Texas Board 
Adopts New Social Studies Curriculum, ABC NEWS, May 24, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=10706913; see also, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding school voucher program); Good News Club v. 
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (concluding that permitting religious student 
groups to use school facilities does not violate the Establishment Clause); Santa Fe Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking student-initiated and student-led prayer at 
school). 
 5 Michael B. Berkman et al., Evolution and Creationism in America’s Classrooms:  A National 
Portrait, 6 PLOSBIOLOGY 920, 921 (2008), http://www.plosbiology.org/article/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0060124 (“Within American politics generally, 
religious-based conflict is increasingly salient; even President Bush has expressed support 
for teaching ‘both sides’ of the evolution controversy.  But opposition to evolution can be 
especially intense at the local level, where teachers live and work.” (citation omitted)); see 
Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Eugenie Scott Toils in Defense of Evolution, 324 SCIENCE 1250, 1250 
(2009) (referring to the “contentious battle over teaching evolution in U.S. public 
schools” over the last two decades); Glenn Branch, Understanding Creationism After Kitzmil-
ler, 57 BIOSCIENCE 278, 284 (2007) (“[T]he teaching of evolution in the public schools 
remains under siege.”); Richard B. Katskee, Why It Mattered to Dover That Intelligent Design 
Isn’t Science, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 112, 158 (2006) (stating that “no one doubts that 
the [Kitzmiller] lawsuit constituted a major front in the culture war.”); Stephen A. New-
man, Evolution and the Holy Ghost of Scopes:  Can Science Lose the Next Round?, 8 RUTGERS 
J.L. & RELIGION 11, *5 (2007) (“Evolution . . . remains the subject of passionate opposi-
tion in America.”); id. at *6 (“The legal battle over the teaching of evolution has raged for 
over eighty years.”); Josh Rosenau, Don’t Mess with Textbooks, SEED MAG. (May 20, 2009), 
http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/dont_mess_with_textbooks/ (“In the last two 
years alone, 18 bills [similar to academic freedom bills] in 10 states have targeted the 
teaching of evolution.”).  It should also be noted that some prominent legal scholars have 
advocated for a middle ground of sorts in the evolution instruction debate.  Professor 
Wexler, among others, has argued persuasively for the position that the “controversy” 
over evolution should only be excluded from public school science classes, and that there 
may well be a useful place for introducing students to the debate in comparative religion 
or social studies classes.  See Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment:  Teaching 
the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 787 (2003) (describing as 
an “improvement” a system where “history teachers could teach about the history of the 
opposition to evolution in American history classes; civics teachers could teach about the 
ongoing controversy over origins in those classes; philosophy teachers could teach about 
the epistemological claims of science and religion there”); see also Alan I. Leshner, Edi-
torial, Redefining Science, 309 SCIENCE 221 (2005) (“[I]t is appropriate to teach about be-
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so contentious that, for at least forty years, the federal courts have 
been the predominant source of lasting resolutions to issues of evolu-
tion instruction.6  Despite the passion on both sides of the controver-
sy, the outcome has been overwhelmingly one-sided.7  Every chal-
lenged legislative or regulatory attempt to eliminate or curtail the 
teaching of evolution in public school science classes has been invali-
dated by the courts under the Establishment Clause.8  As a result, op-
ponents of teaching evolution have been forced to reevaluate and 
transform their political strategy.9 
Recent political activity in the area provides a clear example.  Evo-
lution opponents in at least twelve states have recently attempted,10 
with notable success in Texas and Louisiana, to enact measures that 
 
lief-based concepts like ID [Intelligent Design] in humanities courses, in classes compar-
ing religious points of view, or in philosophy courses that contrast religious and scientific 
approaches to the world.  However, what is taught in science class should be limited to 
science.”). 
 6 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating the Louisiana “balanced 
treatment” act); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 97 (striking down ban on teaching evolution); Frei-
ler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), reh’g denied, 201 F.3d 
602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (striking a Louisiana evolution disclai-
mer); Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975) (striking an antievolutionist statute 
in Tennessee); Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(invalidating facially neutral evolution disclaimer); Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 707 
(striking a Dover Area School District (Pennsylvania) evolution disclaimer); McLean v. 
Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (invalidating Arkansas’ “balanced-
treatment” statute); see also Nicholas A. Schuneman, One Nation, Under . . . The Watchmak-
er?:  Intelligent Design and the Establishment Clause, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 179 (2007) (“For 
nearly eighty years, American courts have mediated the debate between creationists and 
evolutionists.”).  That is not to say that political “solutions” have been entirely inconse-
quential, see, e.g., Press Release, Cobb County School District, Agreement Ends Textbook 
Sticker Case (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://ncseweb.net/webfm_send/878 (explain-
ing the County’s decision to settle after losing at trial but winning a remand and new trial 
on appeal as avoiding the “distraction and expense of starting all over”), but they have in 
many cases proven to be remarkably fickle and temporary.  See, e.g., Evolution Debate in 
Kansas (12/4/06), AM. GEOLOGICAL INST. GOV’T AFFS. PROGRAM (Dec. 4, 2006), 
http://www.agiweb.org/gap/evolution/KS.html (noting that as of 2006, “[t]he science 
standards for public schools in Kansas have been rewritten five times in the past eight 
years”). 
 7 See cases cited supra note 6.  Since Epperson, every measure to combat evolution instruc-
tion has been invalidated by the federal courts under the Establishment Clause. 
 8 See cases cited supra note 6. 
 9 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 5, at *29 (“After the Supreme Court’s ruling in Epperson, the 
term ‘creationism’ was replaced by the newly minted ‘creation science.’  When this re-
naming failed in McLean and in Edwards, the reference to ‘creation’ was jettisoned in fa-
vor of the next theoretical term, ‘intelligent design.’”); Schuneman, supra note 6, at 179 
(describing the emergence of new political strategies in response to judicial decisions like 
Epperson and Edwards striking antievolutionist policies). 
 10 For a more detailed description of those unsuccessful state efforts, see discussion infra 
note 109. 
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significantly depart from previous practice.11  While antievolutionist 
strategy toward evolution instruction has always been dynamic in the 
face of consistent rebukes by the federal courts,12 the policy measures 
previously advanced by evolution opponents were widely applicable 
legislative or regulatory mandates as to how human origins must be 
taught in public school science classes.13  Although these measures 
employed different methods, from prohibiting evolution instruction 
outright to requiring that disclaimers be read to students about the 
veracity of evolutionary theory,14 they all provided clear instructions 
to educators.  By contrast, recent enactments take what this Article 
contends is a dramatic turn from the preceding legislative or quasi-
legislative prescriptions regarding evolution instruction toward a “dis-
tributive model” for addressing evolution questions, in which legisla-
tures or regulators promulgate generalized statements that empower 
and encourage local educators to set evolution instruction policy 
through a series of individualized determinations about how evolu-
tion should be taught.  This shift toward a distributive model supports 
a corresponding shift in the way evolution instruction policy meas-
ures are evaluated from a pure Establishment Clause analysis to one 
employing principles endemic to administrative law. 
Changing perspective in this way does not require that traditional 
analyses under the Establishment Clause be cast aside or otherwise 
 
 11 See Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008); 19 TEX. 
ADMIN. CODE § 112.31–.41 (2009).  The full text of Texas’ revised state science standards 
is published in Chapter 112 of Title 19 of the Texas Administrative Code. 
 12 See Katskee, supra note 5, at 119 (“That legal strategy [by antievolutionists in Kitzmiller] 
had its roots in a longstanding creationist program to exploit language in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Edwards v. Aguillard to circumvent Edwards’ [stet] holding barring the 
teaching of biblical creationism . . . .”); Frank S. Ravitch, Playing the Proof Game:  Intelligent 
Design and the Law, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 841, 852 (2009) (explaining that after the 
Court’s decision in Epperson, “[a]s creationism begat creation science, creation science 
would soon beget a much more powerful offspring, Intelligent Design”); id. at 896 (de-
scribing the current state of evolution instruction policy as “primarily a response to cases 
decided under the Establishment Clause”); Kevin Trowel, Note, Divided by Design:  Kitz-
miller v. Dover Area School District, Intelligent Design, and Civic Education, 95 GEO. L.J. 
855, 866 (2007) (“Creationism’s proponents have approached each legal defeat as an op-
portunity to reformulate the doctrine and to prepare it for future challenges.”). 
 13 As discussed infra Part II, evolution instruction policy has gone through a few discrete 
stages since its reemergence as a controversial issue in Epperson, but prior to the most re-
cent policy movement, all of the policy measures introduced to challenge evolution in-
struction took the form of generally applicable legal mandates to educators and students.  
See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (“balanced treatment” act); Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (prohibition); Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. 
Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (disclaimer). 
 14 See, e.g., Epperson, 393 U.S. at 102–03; Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 
707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
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discouraged, but instead allows for a more comprehensive under-
standing of the distributive model by opening it to consideration 
from an administrative policy making as well as a broader constitu-
tional vantage point, all of which implicates interesting and potential-
ly damning questions about the model’s political and legal validity 
that are not revealed by a conventional Establishment Clause analysis.  
Part II of this Article briefly traces the history of the evolution debate.  
Part III introduces the distributive model as the present manifesta-
tion of evolution instruction policy.  Part IV argues that the model is 
better understood by reference to administrative law principles, and 
Part V demonstrates, without attempting to reach a definitive conclu-
sion, how this fresh vantage point raises new issues of, inter alia, the 
distributive model’s political legitimacy. 
II.  THE EVOLUTION INSTRUCTION DEBATE 
The history of the evolution instruction debate has at least two 
notable features.  The development of evolution instruction policy 
has been dynamic and essentially linear, with new approaches to li-
miting the teaching of evolution emerging in the place of judicially 
invalidated policy measures.15  Only within the last decade have op-
ponents of evolution instruction advanced a multi-faceted policy 
agenda.16  Another historical feature of the evolution instruction de-
bate is the doctrinal path followed by policy makers, courts, and 
commentators in evaluating evolution education policy.  This doc-
trinal path has been much more static and one-dimensional than its 
policy counterpart, as evolution instruction issues have been treated 
 
 15 See, e.g., Chet K. W. Pager, The Establishment of Evolution:  Public Courts and Public Class-
rooms, 81 TUL. L. REV. 17, 25 (2006) (explaining that after the Court struck Arkansas’ ban 
on teaching evolution, “[a]s a frontal assault on education was no longer constitutionally 
valid, creationists were forced to adopt increasingly nuanced strategies” in the evolution 
instruction debate); id. at 56–57 (pointing out that the Court’s Establishment Clause juri-
sprudence “provides a framework for antievolutionists to refine their strategies in ways 
which meet their goals yet are in accordance with judicial doctrine”). 
 16 See Deborah A. Reule, Note, The New Face of Creationism: The Establishment Clause and the 
Latest Efforts to Suppress Evolution in Public Schools, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2555, 2581–88 (2001) 
(identifying and examining in detail the three general means of combating evolution 
post-Edwards:  removing evolution from state science curricula; including evolution dis-
claimers in science classes and texts; and teaching intelligent design); Schuneman, supra 
note 6, at 179 (describing the “third era” of evolution instruction policy as including “at-
tempts to eliminate evolutionary theory from standardized tests, the use of disclai-
mers . . . and the presentation of scientific and philosophical ‘evidence’ against evolu-
tion”). 
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exclusively as questions of religious establishment under the First 
Amendment.17 
The debate over evolution instruction in public schools is a subset 
of the broader debate about the relationship between Darwinian evo-
lution and religious faith, a debate as old as Darwinism itself.18  Al-
though he was not the first evolutionist—the theory can be traced to 
the fifth century BCE and attributed to such prominent thinkers as 
Empedocles and Aristotle,19 as well as to Darwin’s contemporaries20—
Darwin’s support for the theory of natural selection21 made his evolu-
 
 17 There is also support for the proposition that opponents of evolution instruction have 
historically been—and continue to be—religiously motivated in their criticisms of evolu-
tion and its inclusion in public school science curricula.  See, e.g., Selman v. Cobb Cnty. 
Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1311 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (invalidating a facially-neutral evo-
lution disclaimer on the grounds that “religiously-motivated individuals have specifically 
asked school boards to . . . adopt[] this specific language, . . . [and] the Cobb County 
School Board appears to have sided with these religiously-motivated individuals”); Bhatta-
charjee, supra note 5, at 1250 (describing recent “assaults on science standards” as “closet 
creationism being introduced through wording not obvious to those unfamiliar with the 
history of the controversy”); Gordy Slack, The Evolution of Creationism, SALON (Nov. 13, 
2007), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/11/13/intelligent_design/index.html 
[hereinafter Slack, The Evolution of Creationism] (arguing that religiously-motivated crea-
tion science “adapted” to unfavorable judicial rulings by “cutting God off its letterhead 
and calling itself ‘intelligent design’”).  While this is an important issue in terms of eva-
luating evolution instruction policy under the Establishment Clause, see, e.g., Edwards, 482 
U.S. at 585, 591 (defining the purpose prong of Lemon as prohibiting statutes that intend 
to advance religion and explaining that the statute at issue could not withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny because its “preeminent purpose . . . was clearly to advance the religious 
viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind”); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 
529 F. Supp. 1255, 1261, 1263 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (invalidating Arkansas’ balanced treat-
ment statute based on the conclusion that it was part of a “religious crusade . . . motivated 
by opposition to the theory of evolution and [a] desire to see [creationism] taught in the 
public schools,” and because one of the statute’s sponsors was “motivated solely by his re-
ligious beliefs and his desire to see the Biblical version of creation taught in the public 
schools”), it is less significant for purposes of this discussion, which focuses on non-
Establishment Clause contexts for considering questions about the teaching of evolution.  
It is sufficient for this Article to acknowledge that the doctrinal history of the evolution 
instruction debate has to date been singularly religious, regardless of the motivations of 
antievolutionist policy makers. 
 18 Joan DelFattore, Speaking of Evolution:  The Historical Context of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area 
School District, 9 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 29 (2007) (“As soon as On the Origin of Spe-
cies was published, a debate about its relationship to religious faith erupted . . . .”). 
 19 See RANDY MOORE, EVOLUTION IN THE COURTROOM:  A REFERENCE GUIDE 114, 151 (2002); 
GEORGE E. WEBB, THE EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY IN AMERICA 1 (1994). 
 20 See MOORE, supra note 19 (explaining that Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, and his 
contemporary, Alfred Wallace, made contributions to the study of evolution). 
 21 Natural selection, more colloquially referred to as “survival of the fittest,” is the theory 
that organisms “evolved” by adapting to their environments in ways that facilitated their 
survival.  See CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1859).   
Darwin was the first to propose that the evolution of species was due to the relative 
advantage conveyed to certain phenotypic variations within a species—those better 
suited to survival and reproduction will reproduce more often, according to Dar-
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tionary theory immediately and highly controversial as a challenge to 
deeply-held religious beliefs about human origins, in particular the 
biblical story of creation.22  From its Darwinist beginnings, therefore, 
the debate about how humans originated on Earth has been rooted 
in contentions about the relationship between religion and science.23 
The dispute about evolution instruction in public schools 
emerged from this broader debate and followed a similarly religious 
path.  Following World War I, a fundamentalist Christian revival be-
gan in response to the perceived moral degradation of society.24  One 
of the primary targets of this new fundamentalism was evolution,25 
which the movement’s adherents considered “unscientific and dan-
gerous” due principally to its inconsistency with creationism.26  Fun-
damentalists’ chosen forum in which to challenge evolutionary theory 
was in America’s public schools,27 where the issue for lawmakers and 
 
win, thus leading to a predominance of the advantageous phenotypic variation in 
subsequent generations.  In other words, optimal phenotypes emerged and gained 
dominance through a process of unguided survival of the fittest, otherwise known 
as “natural selection.”  
  Schuneman, supra note 6, at 18,384 (citing NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 427–28 (3d ed. 
1993)). 
 22 DelFattore, supra note 18, at 37 (noting that “any comprehensive consideration of Victo-
rian-era opposition to Darwinism must pay serious attention to the question of the rela-
tionship between religion and science”).  Professor DelFattore also notes that the most 
strident conflict between religion and science surrounding evolution “is largely limited to 
fundamentalist Christians and confined to the undeniable statement that the theory of 
evolution does not bear out a literal reading of Genesis.”  Id. 
 23 Id. at 29 (“As soon as On the Origin of Species was published, a debate about its relationship 
to religious faith erupted . . . .”). 
 24 See EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS:  THE SCOPES TRIAL AND AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING DEBATE OVER SCIENCE AND RELIGION 32–37 (1997); Pager, supra note 15, at 
21 (describing the “religious revival in the 1920’s” because “church leaders were con-
cerned with the moral decline of America following the First World War”). 
 25 See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258–59 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (explaining 
that “[t]he religious movement known as Fundamentalism began in nineteenth century 
America as part of evangelical Protestantism’s response to social changes, new religious 
thought and Darwinism. . . . Following World War I . . . Fundamentalism focused on evo-
lution as responsible for [a perceived decline in traditional morality]”). 
 26 Joyce F. Francis, Comment, Creationism v. Evolution:  The Legal History and Tennessee’s Role 
in that History, 63 TENN. L. REV. 753, 755 (1996).  Creationism is adherence to the account 
of human origins in the Book of Genesis.  See N. Patrick Murray & Neil D. Buffaloe, Crea-
tionism and Evolution:  The Real Issues, in EVOLUTION VERSUS CREATIONISM:  THE PUBLIC 
EDUCATION CONTROVERSY 454 (J. Peter Zetterberg ed., 1983) (“[Creationism is defined 
as] the viewpoint that the literal Biblical account of creation is the correct explanation for 
the origin of the earth and its living forms.”). 
 27 Derek H. Davis, Kansas Versus Darwin:  Examining the History and Future of the Creationism-
Evolution Controversy in American Public Schools, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 212 (1999) 
(describing the conflict between Darwinism and the rise to prominence of Christian fun-
damentalism in the early twentieth century, and explaining that during that period crea-
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judges remained how to resolve the tension between religious and 
scientific explanations of human origins. 
A.  Religiously Explicit Policies 
During the 1920s, Oklahoma, Mississippi, Arkansas, Florida, Tex-
as, and Tennessee all passed laws designed to prevent the teaching of 
evolution in public schools.28  Evolutionists brought the first—and 
perhaps still most well-known—legal challenge on the subject to the 
Tennessee Supreme Court in 1927 in the famous Scopes Monkey Tri-
al.29  The Tennessee Anti-Evolution Act prohibited the teaching of 
“any theory that denies the story of the divine creation of man as 
taught in the Bible . . . .”30  At trial, the court effectively precluded ei-
ther party from presenting scientific evidence, making it “inevitable 
that most of the case would deal with the clash between science and 
religion as viewed by fundamentalist creationists.”31  Despite the fact 
that the United States Supreme Court had yet to incorporate the First 
Amendment against the states,32 defendant John T. Scopes chal-
lenged (unsuccessfully) the constitutionality of the Act on religious 
grounds under the state constitution.33  Although the trial constituted 
a legal victory for antievolutionists, it was a loss for the movement in 
the court of public opinion,34 and the issue was largely relegated to 
local attempts to discourage the teaching of evolution after 1928.35 
 
tionists “declared war on the evolutionists, a war whose biggest battlefield would become 
the nation’s public schools”). 
 28 Pager, supra note 15, at 22. 
 29 See Scopes v. State, 278 S.W. 57 (Tenn. 1925), rev’d on other grounds, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 
1927). 
 30 Scopes, 289 S.W. at 363–64 n.1. 
 31 DelFattore, supra note 18, at 44. 
 32 The Supreme Court first incorporated the First Amendment into the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940): 
The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment 
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.  The First Amend-
ment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  The Fourteenth Amendment has 
rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such 
laws. 
  Id. at 303. 
 33 See Scopes v. State, 278 S.W. 57 (Tenn. 1925), rev’d on other grounds, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 
1927); DelFattore, supra note 18, at 46–47. 
 34 See Pager, supra note 15, at 23 (explaining that after the decision in Scopes, “Tennessee was 
broadly perceived as laughably backward, antievolutionist sentiment subsided, and few 
states attempted similar statutes”). 
 35 See Reule, supra note 16, at 2570 (citing DOROTHY NELKIN, THE CREATION CONTROVERSY:  
SCIENCE OR SCRIPTURE IN THE SCHOOLS 33 (1982)).  The statute that would give rise to 
the next great legal battle over evolution instruction was already on the books in Arkan-
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Forty years later, the controversy resurfaced in Epperson v. Arkan-
sas36 with a challenge to an Arkansas statute prohibiting teaching that 
humankind “ascended or descended from a lower order of animals.”37  
The trial court, like its counterpart in Scopes, refused to permit scien-
tific evidence in support of evolution, instead focusing on the dam-
age that teaching evolution would do to religious values in the com-
munity.38  The Supreme Court struck down the statute under the 
Establishment Clause—which after Scopes had been incorporated 
against the states39—because it prohibited teaching evolution “for the 
sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a . . . particular interpre-
tation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.”40  Epper-
son altered antievolutionists’ policy focus from outright bans on 
teaching evolution to the concept of “scientific creationism,” the view 
that the biblical creation account can be supported scientifically.41 
The initial vehicle for promoting scientific creationism was ba-
lanced treatment legislation, which required that scientific creation-
ism and evolution be taught side-by-side.42  Arkansas adopted a ba-
lanced treatment statute in 198143 which was based on the model 
Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science Act by crea-
tionist Paul Ellwanger.44  Supporters of evolution instruction promptly 
 
sas.  See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 n.17 (1968) (noting that “Arkansas’ law 
was adopted by popular initiative in 1928, three years after Tennessee’s law was enacted 
and one year after the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in the Scopes case”). 
 36 393 U.S. at 97. 
 37 Id. at 99. 
 38 See MOORE, supra note 19, at 52. 
 39 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (applying the First Amendment against 
the states through its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 40 Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103. 
 41 See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (“In the 1960’s 
and early 1970’s, several Fundamentalist organizations were formed to promote the idea 
that the Book of Genesis was supported by scientific data.  The terms ‘creation science’ 
and ‘scientific creationism’ have been adopted by these Fundamentalists as descriptive of 
their study of creation and the origins of man.”); Chris Mooney, The Dover Monkey Trial, 
SEED MAG., (Oct. 1, 2005), http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/
the_dover_monkey_trial/ (“In the wake of [Epperson], the anti-evolutionist legal strategy 
advocated ‘equal time’ legislation . . . .”). 
 42 See McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1261–63 (noting that the balanced treatment legislation at 
issue was prepared by the founder of a Fundamentalist organization and was designed to 
avoid the constitutional trappings of prior evolution statutes); Reule, supra note 16, at 
2573 n.124 (explaining that the balanced treatment legislation at issue in McLean was 
“specifically designed to avoid conflict with the First Amendment” in light of Epperson). 
 43 See Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution Science Act, ARK. STAT. ANN. 
§ 80-1663 (1981 Supp.). 
 44 See CREATIONISM, SCIENCE AND THE LAW: THE ARKANSAS CASE 1 (Marshall C. LaFollette 
ed., 1983). 
Nov. 2010] JUDGING DARWIN 91 
 
challenged the Act as unconstitutional in McLean v. Arkansas.45  Al-
though the district court in McLean permitted both sides to present 
expert scientific testimony at trial, the statute was invalidated on fa-
miliar Establishment Clause grounds,46 namely because the creation 
science information and arguments presented to the court “simply 
omit Biblical references” without changing the Act’s religious “con-
tent and message.”47 
Five years later, the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana statute 
on similar grounds.48  After McLean, Louisiana passed a revised ba-
lanced treatment statute that defined creation science as “scientific 
evidences for creation and inferences from those scientific evi-
dences.”49  After hearing a wide range of arguments from both sides, 
including arguments based on the scientific validity of creation 
science and evolution, the Court held that the statute violated the Es-
tablishment Clause because its actual purpose was to “change the 
science curriculum . . . to provide persuasive advantage to a particular 
religious doctrine that rejects . . . evolution in its entirety.”50  Unable 
to rely on balanced treatment legislation, evolution opponents were 
again forced to recreate their approach to combating evolution in-
struction in public schools.51 
The response was a form of evolution disclaimer, a statement that 
is read to students or placed in science textbooks by school officials 
and that questions the validity of evolutionary theory.52  A Louisiana 
 
 45 529 F. Supp. at 1255. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 1271. 
 48 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987) (invalidating the Louisiana Balanced 
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act, 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.1–.7). 
 49 Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426, 429 (E.D. La. 1985).  The case was renamed when 
Edwin Edwards succeeded David Treen as governor of Louisiana. 
 50 Edwards, 482 U.S. at 592. 
 51 See Mooney, supra note 41, at 31 (“With their ‘creation science’ strategies struck down by 
the Supreme Court, anti-evolutionists almost immediately launched another tactic:  they 
morphed into defenders of ‘intelligent design.’”). 
 52 Professor Wright describes evolution textbook disclaimers by explaining that: 
 As the caselaw has developed, there is no absolute uniformity as to the language 
of evolution textbook disclaimers.  However, a typical such disclaimer may read as 
follows: ‘This textbook contains material on evolution.  Evolution is a theory, not a 
fact, regarding the origin of living things.  This material should be approached 
with an open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered.’”   
  R. George Wright, Your Mileage May Vary:  A General Theory of Legal Disclaimers, 7 PIERCE L. 
REV. 85, 103–04 (2008).  The disclaimer in Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education 
stated: 
It is hereby recognized by the Tangipahoa Board of Education, that the lesson to 
be presented, regarding the origin of life and matter, is known as the Scientific 
Theory of Evolution and should be presented to inform students of the scientific 
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school board enacted a requirement that teachers read a statement to 
science students before they begin studying evolution.  The statement 
explained that the teaching of evolution was not intended to discou-
rage their belief in the “Biblical version of Creation” or any other 
concept of human origins and encouraged students to form their 
own opinions or adhere to those of their parents.53  The district court 
in Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education invalidated the dis-
claimer54 and the circuit court affirmed, ruling that the statement 
conferred an unconstitutional benefit on a religious doctrine under 
the Establishment Clause.55  The Supreme Court declined to grant 
certiorari, but did so over Justice Scalia’s dissent on behalf of three 
members of the Court,56 perhaps signaling to evolution opponents 
that less religiously explicit critiques of evolutionary theory would be 
more likely to survive an Establishment Clause challenge.57 
B.  Facially Neutral Challenges 
Regardless of whether it was, in fact, a reaction to Justice Scalia’s 
dissent, Freiler represents an era in the evolution instruction debate 
when opponents of evolution instruction shifted from religiously ex-
plicit attempts to discourage or supplement evolution instruction to 
facially neutral ones.58  This shift can be seen in the emergence of the 
 
concept and not intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical version of Creation 
or any other concept. 
It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the basic right and pri-
vilege of each student to form his/her own opinion or maintain beliefs taught by 
parents on this very important matter of the origin of life and matter.  Students 
are urged to exercise critical thinking and gather all information possible and 
closely examine each alternative toward forming an opinion. 
  975 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. La. 1997). 
 53 See id. at 821 (evaluating a disclaimer to be read to public school science students imme-
diately before a unit of study in which “the scientific theory of evolution is to be pre-
sented”). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Freiler v. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), reh’g denied, 201 
F.3d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000). 
 56 See Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(denying certiorari). 
 57 See id. at 1253 (arguing that the evolution disclaimer satisfied the effects prong of the 
Lemon test, despite its explicit use of creationism as an “illustrative example”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 58 Compare Freiler, 975 F. Supp. at 821 (considering a disclaimer explaining to students that 
the teaching of evolution was not intended to discourage their belief in the “Biblical ver-
sion of Creation”), with Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292 (N.D. 
Ga. 2005) (evaluating a requirement that a sticker be placed in high school biology text-
books stating that evolution “is a theory, not a fact,” and “should be approached with an 
open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered”).  This shift is also evident in the 
public statements made by prominent evolution opponents like the Discovery Institute 
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“Teach the Controversy” movement at the turn of the century.59  Pro-
ponents of this new approach advocated for revised evolution dis-
claimers in light of Freiler, teaching intelligent design as an alternative 
theory to evolution,60 and revising state science standards to deem-
phasize or otherwise discourage evolution instruction.61  These ap-
proaches are notable because they do not include any mention of a 
particular religion or religious doctrine.  They challenge evolution 
instruction by either discouraging student exposure to or confidence 
in the veracity of Darwin’s theory, or by advancing an “alternative” 
explanation of human origins that claims to be scientific rather than 
religious.62 
After Freiler, two facially neutral evolution disclaimers were 
enacted in two separate states, and both were challenged in federal 
court.  In 2004, a school district in Cobb County, Georgia required 
that a sticker be placed in high school biology textbooks stating that 
evolution “is a theory, not a fact,” and “should be approached with an 
 
Center for Science and Culture.  In 1999, an internal document outlining the Center’s 
new Wedge Strategy for challenging evolution instruction described the Center’s mission 
as “[seeking] to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist worldview [including 
evolution theory], and to replace it with a science consonant with Christian and theistic 
convictions.”  DISCOVERY INST. CTR. FOR THE RENEWAL OF SCI. & CULTURE, The Wedge Strat-
egy, ANTIEVOLUTION.ORG, http://www.antievolution.org/features/wedge.html (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2010) [hereinafter DISCOVERY INSTITUTE, Wedge Strategy].  In 2009, the same Cen-
ter for Science and Culture described itself as a program designed to “support[] research 
by scientists and other scholars” into alternatives to Darwinian evolution and to “encour-
age[] schools to improve science education” by teaching students about the “scientific 
weaknesses” of evolutionary theory.  See DISCOVERY INST. CTR. SCI. & CULTURE, 
http://www.discovery.org/csc/aboutCSC.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). 
 59 Eugenie C. Scott, What’s Wrong with the “Teach the Controversy” Slogan?, 42 MCGILL J. EDUC. 
307, 312 (2007) (“During the early 2000s the Discovery Institute refocused its efforts from 
promoting [intelligent design] to concentrating on the ‘weaknesses of evolution.’ . . .  
This was the origin of the ‘Teach the Controversy’ slogan . . . .”); Slack, The Evolution of 
Creationism, supra note 17, at 1–2 (“Teach the controversy is the new mantra of the [intel-
ligent design] movement.”); Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Casey 
Luskin) (supporting “teaching evolution in [a] manner that allows students to ask hard 
questions and really investigate and analyze the issues [relating to the] . . . scientific con-
troversy over evolution”). 
 60 See Top Questions, DISCOVERY INST. CTR. SCI. & CULTURE, http://www.discovery.org/
csc/topQuestions.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (defining the theory of intelligent design 
as holding “that certain features of the universe and of living things are best explained by 
an intelligent cause, not an undirected process such as natural selection”). 
 61 See Reule, supra note 16, at 2581–88 (identifying and examining in detail the three gener-
al means of combating evolution post-Edwards:  removing evolution from state science 
curricula; evolution disclaimers in science classes and texts; and teaching intelligent de-
sign). 
 62 This is different from balanced treatment statutes, which attempted to support an overtly 
religious position on scientific grounds. 
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open mind, studied carefully, and critically considered.”63  Despite the 
disclaimer’s silence as to any religious doctrine or language, the dis-
trict court in Selman v. Cobb County School District64 invalidated the dis-
claimer under the Establishment Clause because it conveyed the mes-
sage that those who “oppose evolution for religious reasons . . . are 
favored members of the political community.”65  Shortly after the Sel-
man decision, a district court in Pennsylvania considered an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to a requirement that school officials read 
a statement to ninth grade science students that evolution is “not a 
fact,” and that “[g]aps in the [t]heory exist for which there is no evi-
dence.”66  The statement went on to mention intelligent design as an 
alternative to evolution and referred students to its reference book 
for more information on the topic.67  The district court struck the dis-
claimer as a violation of the Establishment Clause, primarily on the 
grounds that a reasonable observer would conclude that the disclai-
mer—including its reference to the theory of intelligent design—was 
intended to promote a religious agenda.68  Although the disclaimers 
 
 63 Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1292 (N.D. Ga. 2005), vacated and 
remanded by 449 F.3d 1320, 1338 (2006) (requiring additional facts to be developed on the 
record, but explicitly stating that “we do not intend to make any implicit rulings on any of 
the legal issues that arise from the facts once they are found on remand.  We intend no 
holding on any of the legal premises that may have shaped the district court’s conclusions 
on the three Lemon prongs”). 
 64 Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. 
 65 Id. at 1306. 
 66 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 67 See id. at 708–09 (explaining that the intelligent design “reference book, Of Pandas and 
People, is available for students” to see if they would like to explore this view).  Intelligent 
design is a theory of human origins based on the idea that human development was 
guided by an “intelligent designer” rather than Darwinian natural selection.  See also Top 
Questions, supra note 60 (“The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of 
the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an undi-
rected process such as natural selection.”).  It is not overtly religious in the sense that it 
does not expressly invoke any existing religious doctrine or authority to support its asser-
tions. 
 68 Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (“An objective student is also presumed to know that the 
Dover School Board advocated for the . . . disclaimer in expressly religious terms . . . and 
that the Board adopted the [intelligent design] Policy in furtherance of an expressly reli-
gious agenda.”); see also id. (“[T]he objective student is presumed to know that encourag-
ing the teaching of evolution as a theory rather than as a fact is one of the latest strategies 
to dilute evolution instruction employed by anti-evolutionists with religious motivations.” 
(citing Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1308)).  The Kitzmiller court also concluded that a rea-
sonable observer would understand that intelligent design is “an interesting theological 
argument, but that it is not science,” and that its reference book posits that God is the 
“master intellect” behind human existence.  Id. at 718, 745–46.  But see Arnold H. Loewy, 
The Wisdom and Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in Public Schools, 5 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 82, 88 (2006) (arguing that “teaching intelligent design in public schools 
is constitutional (outside of the unusual context of the Kitzmiller situation)”). 
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at issue in Selman and Kitzmiller were silent with respect to creationism 
or any other overtly religious explanation of human origins, both 
were challenged and adjudged solely under the Establishment 
Clause, confirming the one-dimensional nature of evolution instruc-
tion’s doctrinal history; even when the debate avoids religious lan-
guage, evolution instruction is treated as a religious issue. 
The federal courts’ negative treatment of evolution disclaimers 
and intelligent design69 has left the third method of “teaching the 
controversy,” described generally as the move to revise state science 
standards,70 as the most legally and politically promising.  Historically, 
efforts at revising science curricula have stopped short of explicitly 
prohibiting evolution instruction71 in favor of more subtle,72 less con-
 
 69 In addition to its negative treatment in the courts, there is powerful political evidence 
supporting the conclusion that intelligent design is not likely to play a significant role in 
antievolutionist strategy going forward.  See, e.g., PAUL R. GROSS ET AL., THOMAS B. 
FORDHAM INST., THE STATE OF STATE SCIENCE STANDARDS 15 (2005), available at 
http://www.edexcellence.net/institute/publication/publication.cfm?id =352 (citing dis-
claimers, rather than intelligent design, as the primary means of response by anti-
evolutionists seeking to discredit evolution); Claudia Wallis, The Evolution Wars, TIME, 
Aug. 15, 2005, at 27, 30 (explaining that creationists are focusing on “attempting to get 
criticism of Darwinian evolution in the science standards, not intelligent design” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  There has yet to be a law enacted that requires intelligent 
design instruction in public school science classes, and antievolutionists denounced that 
prospect in favor of evolution disclaimers.  See Mooney, supra note 41, at 32 (discussing 
how advocates of intelligent design are not pushing for intelligent design instruction, but 
instead are seeking to require that public schools “teach the controversy"); Marilyn Rau-
ber, Creationists Try to Edge Around Ban, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 2004 (ex-
plaining that “the tactic that most worries supporters of evolution is the use of anti-
evolution disclaimers,” rather than the introduction of intelligent design). 
   This is not to say, however, that intelligent design does not continue to capture the 
interest of participants in the evolution instruction debate.  See DISCOVERY INST. CTR. SCI. 
& CULTURE, supra note 58 (stating as one of the four goals of the program to “support[] 
research by scientists and other scholars developing the scientific theory known as intelli-
gent design”); Bhattacharjee, supra note 5, at 1250 (explaining that the battle over evolu-
tion still includes intelligent design).  In the last three years alone, more than thirty law 
review articles have been published with the phrase “intelligent design” in the title.  For 
purposes of this discussion, however, it is sufficient to note that, as a matter of political 
strategy, the promotion of intelligent design theory appears to have fallen out of favor 
with antievolutionists. 
 70 See Reule, supra note 16, at 2581–88 (identifying and examining in detail the three gener-
al means of combating evolution post-Edwards). 
 71 Although Kansas, Mississippi, West Virginia, and Tennessee have at one time come close 
to prohibiting evolution instruction in their state science standards, see Lawrence S. Lern-
er, Teaching Evolution State by State, FREETHOUGHT TODAY, Jan.–Feb. 2001, 
http://www.ffrf.org/fttoday/2001/jan_feb01/lerner.html (explaining that, as of Febru-
ary 2001, four states (Kansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, and West Virginia) had state science 
standards that “ignore evolution completely”), there are currently no states that omit all 
treatment of evolutionary theory from their state science curricula.  As of December, 
2005, however, five states—Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Dako-
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stitutionally-suspect measures.  The policy-level battle over state 
science standards has come to parallel the development of evolution 
disclaimers; revised science standards target the veracity of evolutio-
nary theory while remaining facially neutral with regard to religion. 
For instance, Texas, the nation’s largest purchaser of science text-
books and thus a highly influential force in the direction of public 
science education nationally,73 until recently included language in its 
science standards requiring that educators introduce students to the 
“strengths and weaknesses” of scientific theories, including evolu-
tion.74  This was called the “strengths and weaknesses strategy” by its 
 
ta—had standards that used the term “evolution” either sparingly or not at all, instead 
choosing phrases such as “change over time,” and as many as thirteen States had adopted 
a treatment of evolution described as “useless, disguised, or absent.”  GROSS ET AL., supra 
note 69, at 15, 34, 40, 46–47, 57, 61. 
 72 It may appear at first glance that the distinction between measures like evolution disclai-
mers and teaching intelligent design on the one hand and revised state science standards 
on the other is nominal at best, and that evolution disclaimers and intelligent design in-
struction could themselves be achieved through a shift in state science standards.  While 
on a macro level this is true—a revision of state science standards could be used to prohi-
bit evolution instruction altogether, let alone require the teaching of intelligent design—
for purposes of this discussion, the revision of state science standards is meant in contrast 
to what would traditionally be legislative measures, such as a requirement that disclaimers 
be used or intelligent design be taught in science classes.  Put another way, the process of 
revising state science standards is used here to refer to a more indirect approach to in-
fluencing evolution instruction by changing the guidelines and overarching priorities of 
the state science curriculum, rather than mandating specific conduct.  Although the same 
political actors may participate in, for example, enacting an evolution disclaimer and set-
ting learning goals for science students, the former is considered herein to be something 
beyond a mere revision of state science standards, while the latter is not.  Professor Bow-
man described this distinction as follows: 
Standards do not establish a statewide curriculum in that they do not dictate which 
textbooks must be used or which assignments or methods of in-class assessment 
must be employed, yet they do establish a substantive instructional framework.  
The content of a state’s standards explicitly is intended to influence the instruc-
tion students receive, and to do so at a low cost, compared to many other methods 
of educational reform. 
  Kristi L. Bowman, An Empirical Study of Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design Instruc-
tion in Public Schools, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 301, 310–11 (2007) (citing GROSS ET AL., supra note 
69), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/institute/publication/publication.
cfm?id=352. 
 73 See April Castro, Texas Ed Board Approves Science Standards, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 27, 
2009, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/tx/6346723.html; Darwin’s in the De-
tails, supra note 1 (statement of Bob Garfield) (point out that “since Texas buys 
more . . . textbooks than any other state, it influences [the content of] books every-
where”). 
 74 See Castro, supra note 73 (describing the omission in Texas’ new science standards of the 
“20-year-old requirement that both ‘strengths and weaknesses’ of all scientific theories be 
taught” in Texas); Texas Improves on Strengths and Weaknesses Language in Science Standards 
on Teaching Evolution, DISCOVERY INST. CTR. SCI. & CULTURE (Mar. 29, 2009), 
http://www.discovery.org/a/9851. 
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critics,75 who claim that despite its facial neutrality, it is in fact moti-
vated by a desire to introduce creationism into the classroom.76  Fa-
cially-neutral state science standards like the “strengths and weak-
nesses strategy” fit nicely into the overall historical narrative of the 
evolution instruction debate.  The use of multiple approaches, such 
as evolution disclaimers, intelligent design instruction, and revised 
standards, is consistent with the dynamic history of evolution educa-
tion policy, and the continued focus by advocates and commentators 
on the Establishment Clause as the sole legal context for evaluating 
new evolution instruction policies is a continuation of the debate’s 
monolithic doctrinal pedigree.77  Although the “strengths and weak-
 
 75 Gordy Slack, Texas on Evolution:  Needs Further Study, SALON (Mar. 28, 2009), 
http://www.salon.com/env/feature/2009/03/28/texas_evolution_case/index.html [he-
reinafter Slack, Texas on Evolution] (stating that after the court in Kitzmiller indicated that 
intelligent design was a religious, rather than scientific, concept, and thus unconstitu-
tional as a subject to be taught in public schools, “advocates of teaching neo-creationism 
have been forced to seek other ways into public science classrooms.  Enter the ‘strengths 
and weaknesses’ strategy, crafted by the Seattle-based, pro-intelligent-design think thank 
[sic], Discovery Institute”). 
 76 See Castro, supra note 73 (“The words strengths and weaknesses have become ‘code for 
creationism and (the similar theory of) intelligent design,’ said [Texas State Board of 
Education] member Barbara Cargill.”); Slack, Texas on Evolution, supra note 75 (quoting 
“Eugenie Scott, Director of the National Center for Science Education” as saying that the 
alternative to the creationist strengths and weaknesses strategy was “to continue amend-
ing the standards to achieve through the backdoor what they couldn’t achieve up front”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77 The legal scholarship on evolution instruction has focused almost exclusively on the con-
stitutionality of teaching evolution under the Establishment Clause.  See Bowman, supra 
note 72, at 317 (“[T]he constitutional tests that are most often considered to be the focus 
of a legal analysis of creationism or intelligent design instruction . . . all ask whether the 
government is supporting religion; not surprisingly, legal scholarship, too, has focused on 
the same question.”); David Crump, Natural Selection, Irreducible Complexity, and the Bacterial 
Flagellum:  A Contrarian Approach to the Intelligent Design Debate, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) 
(describing the Establishment Clause as the “principal basis of legal objections to the 
consideration of irreducible complexity theory in public schools”); see also David R. Bau-
er, Note, Resolving the Controversy over “Teaching the Controversy”:  The Constitutionality of 
Teaching Intelligent Design in Public Schools, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1019, 1040–43, 1046–50 
(2006) (reviewing the evolution instruction literature and revealing its focus on the Es-
tablishment Clause).  This remained true even after the development and adoption in 
Louisiana and Texas of the “distributive model,” the most recent policy measure ad-
vanced by evolution opponents.  See discussion infra Part III (describing the distributive 
model); see also Jana R. McCreary, This is the Trap the Courts Built:  Dealing with the Entan-
glement of Religion and the Origin of Life in American Public Schools, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(2008) (arguing that allowing the teaching of evolution in schools at the exclusion of 
other doctrines violates the Establishment Clause); Barry P. McDonald, Getting Beyond Re-
ligion as Science:  “Unstifling” Worldview Formation in American Public Education, 66 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 587, 588 (2009) (offering a new approach to teaching human origins in pub-
lic schools and arguing that it is constitutionally viable under the Establishment Clause); 
Ravitch, supra note 12, at 875 (noting the role of other First Amendment principles such 
as the “public forum doctrine” and “equal access concept” in the debate over intelligent 
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nesses” language was omitted from the 2009 version of Texas’ state 
science standards without having ever been challenged in the 
courts,78 it foreshadowed the current campaign in Texas and else-
where around the country to modify state science standards to com-
bat evolution instruction and the resultant debate over the religious 
implications of those revisions.79 
III.  THE DISTRIBUTIVE MODEL 
The modern face of the evolution debate represents a new step in 
the historical development of evolution instruction policy.  The “dis-
tributive model” for challenging the teaching of evolution is related 
to the “strengths and weaknesses” strategy insofar as it is a facially 
 
design instruction); Kelly S. Terry, Shifting out of Neutral:  Intelligent Design and the Road to 
Nonpreferentialism, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 67, 67 (2008) (suggesting the emergence of the 
nonpreferentialist doctrine in Establishment Clause cases involving evolution instruc-
tion); Anita Y. Woudenberg, Propagating A Lemon:  How the Supreme Court Establishes Reli-
gion in the Name of Neutrality, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 307, 308–09 (2009) (suggesting 
that the Establishment Clause should be narrowed in a number of cases, including some 
cases involving evolution instruction, and that the Free Speech Clause is better suited to 
resolve those cases).  Even the rare example of commentary that does not focus on evolu-
tion instruction’s implications under the First Amendment tends not to consider alterna-
tive legal issues.  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Freedom to Err:  The Idea of Natural Selection in 
Politics, Schools, and Courts, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2 (2008) (offering a legislative 
solution to the evolution debate).  For reasons discussed below, it is the thesis of this Ar-
ticle that recent developments in antievolutionist policy-making counsels review from a 
broader perspective that includes questions of religious establishment, but that also al-
lows for a wider array of legal and political issues to be explored in connection with these 
policies. 
 78 See A Setback for Science Education in Texas, NAT’L CTR. SCI. EDUC., (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://ncseweb.org/news/2009/04/setback-science-education-texas-004710 (noting that, 
in passing the new state science standards in Texas, “creationists on the board were un-
successful in inserting the controversial ‘strengths and weaknesses’ language from the old 
set of standards”); Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Bob Garfield) (as say-
ing “[t]he Texas Board of Education voted to do away with the ‘strengths and weaknesses’ 
clause”).  In general, controversial revisions to state science standards come under close 
political scrutiny (and often reversal) before a legal challenge takes place.  See, e.g., Evolu-
tion Debate in Kansas (12/4/06), supra note 6 (noting that as of 2006, “[t]he science stan-
dards for public schools in Kansas have been rewritten five times in the past eight years”). 
 79 See, e.g., Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Eugenie Scott) (“[The new Tex-
as standards] give[] a creationist teacher an opportunity to say, well, you know, perhaps 
you should just read Genesis.  So it’s creationism by the back door.”); id. (statement of 
Casey Luskin) (“[T]eaching evolution in [a] manner that [in accordance with Texas’ new 
standards] allows students to ask hard questions and really investigate and analyze the is-
sues is the best way to teach science.”); Texas Improves on Strengths and Weaknesses Language 
in Science Standards on Teaching Evolution, supra note 74 (“Under [Texas’] new standards, 
students will be expected to analyze and evaluate the scientific evidence for evolution, not 
religion.”); Slack, Texas on Evolution, supra note 75 (“Each of the amendments [to the 
Texas science standards] singles out an old creationist argument, strips it of its overtly 
ideological language, and requires teachers and textbook publishers to adopt it.”). 
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neutral policy focused on the development of state science standards 
that encourage educators to promote critical thinking about scientific 
theories, including evolution.  Unlike prior antievolutionist policy, 
however, the distributive model seeks to shift virtually all responsibili-
ty for deciding how to address the evolution “controversy” to individ-
ual teachers in individual classrooms.80  By empowering educators to 
determine how best to approach the evolution debate on a case-by-
case basis, the distributive model represents a departure from not on-
ly the strengths and weaknesses strategy,81 but from every previous at-
tempt to challenge evolution instruction.  It is most often manifest in 
“academic freedom bills,”82 which have been proposed in several 
states83 and closely resemble the Discovery Institute’s Model Academic 
Freedom Statute on Evolution.84  Academic freedom bills create a plat-
 
 80 The distributive model’s transfer of ultimate authority over how to teach evolution to in-
dividual educators, and not to a government agency like a school board, is significant for 
two reasons.  First, it is an important departure from earlier evolution instruction policies, 
which relied on policy makers like legislatures or school boards.  Second, it is critical to 
antievolutionists’ policy objectives for advancing the distributive model.  If the distribu-
tive model only permitted school boards to make specific decisions about how teachers in 
a particular jurisdiction should teach evolution, those decisions would too closely resem-
ble the type of prospective statements about evolution instruction that have already been 
found unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area 
Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (striking down a school board’s efforts to 
require that an anti-evolution disclaimer be read to students in science class).  Although 
perhaps not as effective a tool for combating evolution instruction, the distributive mod-
el’s delegation of policy-making authority to individual teachers represents a distinct ad-
vantage over broader policies promulgated by school boards because it permits prospec-
tive statements about evolution instruction to remain sufficiently general to avoid 
constitutional challenge.  For further discussion of the difficulties in applying the Estab-
lishment Clause to the distributive model, see infra Part IV.C. 
 81 See discussion infra note 105 (explaining the significant differences between the strengths 
and weaknesses strategy and the distributive model). 
 82 See Bhattacharjee, supra note 5, at 1250 (describing the current evolution instruction de-
bate by stating that “[b]esides periodic assaults on science standards as we recently saw in 
Texas, we are concerned about antievolution legislation in different states under the 
guise of academic freedom bills”). 
 83 See id. (“Just in the last few weeks, antievolution bills awaiting decisions in a number of 
states—Oklahoma, South Carolina, Alabama—died in committee.”); Rosenau, supra note 
5, at 1 (“In the last two years alone, 18 bills [similar to academic freedom bills] in 10 
states have targeted the teaching of evolution.”); see also “Academic Freedom” Bills by State & 
Year, NAT’L CTR. SCI. EDUC. (Mar. 20, 2009), http://ncse.com/creationism/general/
academic-freedom-bills-by-state-year (listing academic freedom bills by state and year). 
 84 Perhaps the most well-known and influential challenger of evolution instruction is the 
Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture.  The Discovery Institute is an organ-
ization that, in its own words, “discovers and promotes ideas in the common sense tradi-
tion of representative government, the free market and individual liberty.”  About Discov-
ery:  Mission Statement, DISCOVERY INST., http://www.discovery.org/about.php (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2010).  The Institute’s Center for Science and Culture describes itself as a pro-
gram designed to “support[] research by scientists and other scholars” into alternatives to 
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form for governments that want to limit, or present alternatives to, 
the teaching of evolution to respond to judicial rejection of evolution 
disclaimers and intelligent design without running afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause.85  The bills do this by stepping back somewhat from 
the policy debate and making broader, more general statements 
about the integrity of science—including evolution—instruction.  
These statements refer to endorsing academic treatment of “the full 
range of scientific views regarding biological and chemical evolu-
tion,”86 but avoid any specific prescription regarding evolution in-
struction.87  Instead they are permissive, encouraging educators to 
engage student inquiries about the controversy surrounding evolu-
tion, but refraining from mandating whether or how they should go 
about doing so.88 
Louisiana and Texas have adopted this new approach.89  In June 
of 2008, Louisiana passed an academic freedom bill called the “Loui-
siana Science Education Act,” which requires the State Board of Sec-
ondary and Elementary Education to “allow and assist teachers” to 
help students think critically about “scientific theo-
 
Darwinian evolution and to “encourage[] schools to improve science education” by 
teaching students about the “scientific weaknesses” of evolutionary theory.  See DISCOVERY 
INST. CTR. SCI. & CULTURE, supra note 58.  The Institute’s Model Academic Freedom Statute on 
Evolution was published on September 7, 2007 and frames the discussion in terms of 
teacher and student rights.  See DISCOVERY INST., MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON 
EVOLUTION (2007), http://www.academicfreedompetition.com/freedom.php.  It ex-
pressly protects the rights of teachers to “present scientific information pertaining to the 
full range of scientific views regarding biological and chemical evolution,” and of students 
to “subscribe to a particular position on any views regarding biological or chemical evolu-
tion.”  Id. §§ 3, 5.  It also states specifically that it is not to be “construed as requiring or 
encouraging any change in the state curriculum standards,” or as “promoting any reli-
gious doctrine.”  Id. at §§ 6, 7. 
 85 See Bhattacharjee, supra note 5, at 1250–51 (describing academic freedom bills as consti-
tuting “closet creationism being introduced through wording not obvious to those unfa-
miliar with the history of the controversy. . . . ID [Intelligent Design] proponents have re-
packaged ID and are promoting it as ‘evidence against evolution’”). 
 86 MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 84, § 3. 
 87 Id. (providing that teachers in elementary and secondary schools “shall have the affirma-
tive right and freedom to present scientific information pertaining to the full range of 
scientific views regarding biological and chemical evolution”). 
 88 See H.B. 397 § 1, Gen. Assem., 10th Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2010), available at http://
www.lrc.ky.gov/record/10RS/HB397.htm (stating that “[t]eachers, principals, and other 
school administrators are encouraged to create and foster an environment within public 
elementary and secondary schools that promotes critical thinking skills, logical analysis, 
and open and objective discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of scientific theo-
ries being studied [including evolution]”). 
 89 See Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1) (2008).  The 
full text of Texas’ revised state science standards is published in Chapter 112 of Title 19 
of the Texas Administrative Code. 
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ries . . . including . . . evolution, the origins of life, global warming, 
and human cloning.”90  The Act defines the assistance available to 
educators as “support and guidance for teachers regarding effective 
ways to help students . . . critique . . . scientific theories . . . including 
[evolution],”91 and expressly permits teachers, in addition to present-
ing the material in the standard textbook provided by the state board, 
to “use supplemental textbooks and other instructional materials to 
help students . . . critique . . . scientific theories.”92  The Act further 
states that it “shall not be construed to promote any religious doc-
trine,”93 and calls for the promulgation of “rules and regulations ne-
cessary to implement” it.94  As with other academic freedom statutes, 
however, Louisiana’s Act does not require educators to introduce any 
critiques of the material in the standard science textbooks, nor does 
it prescribe how educators who choose to take this approach should 
go about promoting such critical scientific thinking in the class-
room.95  The controversy surrounding the Act has been strong.  De-
spite the fact that it refers to theories other than evolution, critics of 
the Act have, consistent with the doctrinal history of the evolution in-
struction debate,96 focused almost exclusively on their perception that 
the Act functions as an invitation to teach creationism and other reli-
giously-based explanations of human origins in science classes.97  The 
 
 90 Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1) (2008). 
 91 Id. § 17:285.1.B(2). 
 92 Id. § 17:285.1.C. 
 93 Id. § 17:285.1.D. 
 94 Id. § 17:285.1.E.  A rule was published in the Louisiana Register on August 20, 2009, and, 
with the exception of some more explicit procedures for challenging an educator’s deci-
sion to utilize supplemental materials in the teaching of evolution, the language of the 
proposed rule echoes that of the Act.  See Bulletin 741-Louisiana Handbook for School 
Administrators, Curriculum and Instruction, Science Education, 35:8 La. Reg. 1476 (Aug. 
20, 2009). 
 95 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) (stating that the State Board of Education “shall 
allow and assist teachers . . . to create and foster an environment . . . that promotes critical 
thinking . . . of scientific theories,” including offering “support and guidance” for those 
efforts) (emphasis added). 
 96 See supra Part II (discussing the doctrinal history of the evolution instruction debate). 
 97 Editorial, Louisiana’s Latest Assault on Darwin, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2008, at A18 (“The 
state, after all, has a sorry history as a hotbed of creationists’ efforts to inject religious 
views into science courses.  All that stands in the way of this retrograde step [via the Loui-
siana Science Education Act] is Gov. Bobby Jindal.”); Letter from Alan I. Leshner, Chief 
Exec. Officer, Am. Assoc. for the Advancement of Sci., to The Honorable Bobby Jindal, 
Governor of La. (June 20, 2008), http://lasciencecoalition.org/docs/
AAAS_Jindal_veto_6.20.08.pdf (“[T]he Louisiana Science Education Act . . . appears de-
signed to insert religious or unscientific views into science classrooms.”); Letter from Ri-
chard O’Grady, Ph.D., Exec. Dir., Am. Inst. of Biological Scis., to La. State Representa-
tives (June 9, 2008), available at http://lasciencecoalition.org/docs/
AIBS_Oppose_SB_733_6.9.08.pdf (criticizing the Louisiana statute as promoting “super-
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Act’s supporters also focus their arguments on the question of reli-
gious establishment, but describe the Act as a religiously-neutral 
move toward more intellectually honest and open-minded discussion 
of controversial scientific topics like evolution in our public schools.98 
Similarly, in March of 2009, the State Board of Education in Tex-
as99 adopted a new set of science standards.100  The new standards seek 
to “encourage critical thinking” about the sciences by “expect[ing]” 
students to “analyze, evaluate, and critique scientific explana-
tions . . . including examining all sides of scientific evidence of those 
scientific explanations” relating to evolution.101  More specifically, un-
der the new standards students are “expected” to “analyze and eva-
luate scientific explanations concerning any data of sudden appear-
ance, stasis, and sequential nature of groups in the fossil record,”102 
“analyze and evaluate scientific explanation concerning the complex-
ity of the cell,”103 and “evaluate the evidence concerning . . . current 
theories of the evolution of the universe, including estimates for the 
age of the universe.”104  Texas’ new standards are analogous to the 
 
natural” explanations of human origins in the classroom); Letter from Dena S. Sher, 
State Legislative Council, Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, to La. State 
Representatives (May 28, 2008), available at http://lasciencecoalition.org/docs/
AU_Oppose_SB_733_5.28.08.pdf (stating that the Louisiana Science Education Act 
“would attempts [sic] to introduce religion into science classrooms’). 
 98 Memorandum from Paul G. Pastorek, La. State Dep’t of Educ., to City, Parish, and other 
Local Sch. Superintendents et al. (Aug. 27, 2008) (defending the Louisiana Science Edu-
cation Act as not “promot[ing] any religious doctrine”); John G. West, Louisiana Con-
founds the Science Thought Police, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 8, 2008), 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NjNjYTNjMTVkNmVhMmYxN2JkMWZhMzYzMG
NjNzY4ZDE (describing opposition to the Louisiana Science Education Act as a “disin-
formation campaign” based on “denouncing the bill as a nefarious plot to sneak religion 
into the classroom”); John G. West, Questions and Answers About the Proposed Louisiana 
Science Education Act, DISCOVERY INST. EVOLUTION NEWS & VIEWS (June 12, 2008), 
http://www.evolutionnews.org/2008/06/questions_and_answers_about_th.html (stating 
that the Louisiana Science Education Act would not “allow the teaching of creationism or 
other religious beliefs”). 
 99 Texas is a particularly important participant in the evolution debate because it is the Na-
tion’s largest purchaser of school textbooks and therefore a significant influence over the 
content and direction of educational science texts.  See Castro, supra note 73. 
100 The full text of Texas’ revised state science standards is published in Chapter 112 of Title 
19 of the Texas Administrative Code. 
101 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 112.34(c)(3)(A) (2009).  The standards also seek to promote crit-
ical thinking about other politically controversial scientific issues such as global warming.  
See id. § 112.37(c)(9)(H) (explaining that the student “is expected to . . . analyze and eva-
luate different views on the existence of global warming”). 
102 Id. § 112.34(c)(7)(B). 
103 Id. § 112.34(c)(7)(G).  Sudden appearance, stasis, and cellular complexity are all con-
cepts used in support of non-evolutionary theories of human origins.  See Slack, Texas on 
Evolution, supra note 75. 
104 19 TEX ADMIN. CODE § 112.36(c)(4)(A) (2009). 
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approach taken in academic freedom bills like Louisiana’s in that 
they make clear to educators that they have the opportunity to intro-
duce criticisms or alternative explanations of human origins, but they 
do not go as far as mandating a method for doing so.105  Also, like the 
Louisiana statute, opinions on both sides of the issue have been plen-
tiful and passionate, and have focused almost exclusively on the ques-
tion of whether the new standards will permit the introduction of re-
ligion into the classroom.106  Detractors have accused the standards of 
intentionally creating opportunities for educators to introduce crea-
tionism in science class,107 while proponents laud the changes as 
 
105 See, e.g., id. § 112.34(c)(7) (explaining that students are “expected to” think critically 
about evolutionary concepts, but not specifying which materials or methods should be 
used to promote such critical thinking).  This feature of Texas’ new standards is not nec-
essarily new in Texas.  The “strengths and weaknesses” language from Texas’ prior stan-
dards could be read as a very similar strategic approach to Texas’ new standard emphasiz-
ing expectations of critical thought.  Texas’ new language is nevertheless important to 
this discussion for at least two reasons.  First, the “strengths and weaknesses” language 
failed to survive the regulatory process, indicating that the new standards are better ref-
lective of the current movement to challenge traditional evolution instruction.  Rather 
than expressly directing educators to introduce weaknesses of evolutionary theory, the 
new standards are potentially broader, in that they could be read to permit educators to 
decide the best way to help students think critically about evolution without necessarily 
focusing on specific weaknesses of evolution itself.  For one instructor this may be to re-
mind students of the definition of a scientific theory as potentially refutable.  See, e.g., 
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 735 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (citing ex-
pert testimony describing the scientific method as a “self-imposed convention of science, 
which limits inquiry to testable, natural explanations about the natural world . . . [and it] 
is a ‘ground rule’ of science today which requires scientists to seek explanations in the 
world around us based upon what we can observe, test, replicate, and verify”).  For anoth-
er, it may mean introducing competing ideas about human origins—like creationism—
into a science class.  By removing the word “weaknesses,” which seems to mandate a direct 
challenge to evolution on its own terms, and replacing it with language about critical 
analysis, Texas’ new standards represent precisely the same approach to the evolution in-
struction issue as academic freedom bills like the Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1 (2008).  Second, and on a related note, Texas adopted its new 
standards in an environment in which academic freedom bills are the most popular poli-
cy measure for opponents of evolution instruction.  See Rosenau, supra note 5, at 1 (“In 
the last two years alone, 18 bills in 10 states have targeted the teaching of evolution.  
These bills . . . authorize teachers to omit evolution or include creationism at their 
whim.”).  This political environment is relevant in interpreting Texas’ regulatory ap-
proach and counsels in favor of reading Texas’ new standards as philosophically consis-
tent with academic freedom bills. 
106 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC., A SETBACK FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION IN TEXAS (Apr. 1, 
2009) (pointing to “creationists” on the board of education who sought to use the new 
science standards to “encourage[] the presentation of creationist claims”); Slack, Texas on 
Evolution, supra note 75 (describing the debate over new science standards in Texas as 
one between “scientists and creationists”). 
107 See Darwin’s in the Details, supra note 1 (statement of Eugenie Scott) (explaining that Tex-
as’ new policy permits individual teachers to respond to student inquiries about evolution 
by saying “perhaps you should just read Genesis”); see also id. (statement of Christine Cas-
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“progressive” and “a significant victory for scientists and educators in 
favor of teaching the scientific evidence for and against evolution.”108 
These examples of the current approach to combating evolution 
instruction are most interesting not for their specific language, but 
for their broader commonalities, which corroborate the emerging 
trend in the debate over teaching evolution.  Louisiana and Texas’ 
enactments, along with the Model Academic Freedom Statute on Evolution 
and many other academic freedom bills that are pending or that 
failed in their respective states,109 represent a movement away from 
sweeping legislative prescriptions for evolution instruction and to-
ward a more diffuse policy approach that shifts decision making 
about the intricacies of teaching evolution from legislatures and regu-
lators to individual educators.110  Previous methods of challenging 
evolution instruction involved generally applicable mandates in the 
form of prohibitions, requirements of balanced treatment, or manda-
tory disclaimers, and were all found invalid under the Establishment 
Clause.111  Recent enactments, by contrast, seek to avoid this problem 
 
tillo Comer, the former Director of Science for the Texas Education Agency, stating that 
Texas’ new science standards may bind teachers “to just have to teach any kind of pseudo-
science” in response to student inquiries about evolution). 
108 Texas Improves on Strengths and Weaknesses Language in Science Standards on Teaching Evolu-
tion, supra note 74. 
109 In addition to successful measures in Louisiana and Texas, evolution opponents intro-
duced similar measures in at least ten other States that were legislatively defeated.  See, 
e.g., “Academic Freedom” Bills by State & Year, supra note 83 (reporting on the defeat of aca-
demic freedom bills in Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, 
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Carolina as of June 6, 2010). 
110 This is confirmed by the enacted regulation implementing the Louisiana Science Educa-
tion Act, 35:8 La. Reg. 1476 (Aug. 20, 2009).  The rule, like the Act under which it was 
promulgated, states that the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education “shall, upon 
request . . . allow and assist teachers and school administrators to create and foster an en-
vironment that promotes critical thinking skills, logical analysis, and open and objective 
discussion of concepts, laws, principles, and scientific theories.”  Id.  It says nothing more 
about how educators are to go about encouraging students to be critical about scientific 
theories, nor does it go as far as the Act in specifying which theories are of particular 
concern. 
111 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628 (1960) (prohibiting public schools from 
teaching “the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower or-
der of animals”); Louisiana Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-
Science in Public School Instruction Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1–17:286.7 (1982) 
(forbidding evolution instruction in public school unless accompanied by instruction in 
creationism); Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1286 (N.D. Ga. 
2005) (invalidating a mandatory disclaimer placed inside every science textbook in the 
district).  There are also prior instances, like the “strengths and weaknesses strategy” em-
ployed in Texas’ former science standards, that do not require educators to engage in 
conduct that challenges or dilutes evolution instruction, but rather create an environ-
ment wherein individual educators could choose to challenge evolutionary theory.  To 
the extent such policy measures existed before the distributive model, they have not been 
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by relying on vague statements about the value of critical thinking 
without taking any overt or official position as to how evolution 
should be taught.  Instead, responsibility is distributed to individual 
educators to make that determination by acting as policy makers who 
are empowered to decide for themselves how to best resolve the issue 
on a case-by-case basis.112 
This “distributive model” for addressing questions of evolution in-
struction has profound implications for the future of the evolution 
instruction debate and for the way in which policy measures based on 
that model are evaluated under the law.  As explained above, the evo-
lution instruction debate has historically been doctrinally one-
dimensional; despite the dynamic nature of the policy measures im-
pacting the debate—including the distributive model—these meas-
ures have all been evaluated solely in terms of their validity under the 
Establishment Clause.113  Regardless of whether religion is in fact the 
driving force behind the development of the distributive model,114 the 
model’s political and legal ramifications are too broad to be treated 
as a single constitutional issue or, for that matter, as solely a matter of 
constitutional law.115 
 
challenged in the courts and nonetheless exhibit some distinct characteristics.  For a full 
discussion of the relevant differences between the “strengths and weaknesses strategy” 
and the distributive model, see supra note 105. 
112 See discussion supra note 80 (describing why the distributive model focuses policy-making 
authority on the individual level, rather than at the agency level through school boards).  
For example, if a science teacher is asked by a student whether evolution is a scientific 
“fact,” the distributive model says little or nothing about how the teacher should respond.  
The teacher could choose to do anything from pointing the student to the definition of a 
scientific theory, to mentioning that a scientific controversy exists surrounding evolution, 
to recommending alternative theories such as intelligent design, to suggesting that the 
student ask their parents or pastor for advice or look to sources like the Book of Genesis 
to explain human origins.  Most, if not all, of these choices would fall within the range of 
conduct permitted by the distributive model, but none is mandated by it. 
113 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
114 See discussion supra notes 97–98, 107–08 and accompanying text (outlining the debate 
about whether academic freedom bills and Texas’ newly revised science standards impli-
cate creationism). 
115 A different approach would be to reconsider the scope of current Establishment Clause 
doctrine to ensure that it can accommodate concerns that even facially neutral policies 
like the distributive model are, at their core, merely attempts by lawmakers to facilitate 
the presentation of religious theories of human origins in science classes.  While this ap-
proach may certainly be worthwhile, and has been addressed in previous publications by 
the author, see Louis J. Virelli III, Making Lemonade:  A New Approach to Evaluating Evolu-
tion Disclaimers Under the Establishment Clause, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 423 (2006) [hereinafter 
Virelli, Making Lemonade], it is not mutually exclusive with the animating position of this 
Article, namely that the distributive model is better viewed in the broader context of 
principles of administrative law. 
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IV.  THE DISTRIBUTIVE MODEL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A more comprehensive view of the distributive model, one that 
incorporates the model’s political and legal complexities, is attaina-
ble only by stepping back from the traditional religious context for 
viewing evolution instruction policy and considering all of the distri-
butive model’s policy features.  When treated in its entirety, the dis-
tributive model ceases to look like a one-dimensional legislative flirta-
tion with religious establishment and begins to reveal itself for what it 
is—a complex public policy measure that raises a wide variety of polit-
ical and legal, including constitutional, issues.  Closer examination 
demonstrates that the most fruitful approach for addressing these is-
sues is through application of principles associated with administra-
tive law.  This Article argues that a consideration of general principles 
germane to administrative law will empower us to ask more and bet-
ter questions about the distributive model than would reliance on the 
Establishment Clause alone. 
A. Administrative Law Principles 
This new analytical approach to evolution instruction first re-
quires an explanation of what is meant—for purposes of this discus-
sion—by reference to “principles” of administrative law.  Administra-
tive law is the collection of political issues and legal doctrines 
surrounding the formation and conduct of administrative agencies.116  
Without question, even under this definition, administrative law is 
not exclusive of constitutional questions.  The constitutional validity 
of state action in the administrative context is no less subject to chal-
lenge—under the Establishment Clause, for instance—where the 
government conduct at issue is an administrative regulation or a sta-
tute. 
 
116 There is little made in this discussion of the sometimes significant differences between 
federal and state administrative law.  This is not due to a lack of recognition of those dif-
ferences, but instead to the nature of the relevant inquiry.  Although it is clear that the 
distributive model is an artifact of state law, and thus will be more directly impacted by 
state, as opposed to federal, administrative law, that distinction is rendered less important 
by the higher-level claim made herein.  As will be discussed further in Part V, infra, the 
broad principles mentioned here are relevant to both federal and state administrative law 
and, as such, make that otherwise significant distinction less important to the instant 
analysis.  To the extent later discussions of, for example, political legitimacy in the admin-
istrative context rely on the federal system as a reference, that is in the interest of simplic-
ity and is neither meant to imply, nor does it in actuality represent, a relevant substantive 
difference between federal and state law in that area. 
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It does not follow, however, that administrative law is not in some 
ways unique, and indeed it is.  Administrative law implicates questions 
of political legitimacy that are far less common in cases where power 
is exercised by a constitutionally-created branch of government.117  
The powers of those branches are viewed as legitimate because they 
are expressly enumerated in the Constitution.118  The authority of 
agency action, by contrast, is far less clear as a matter of constitutional 
text and is more difficult to reconcile with accepted tenets of demo-
 
117 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:  Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Adminis-
trative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountabili-
ty] (“From the birth of the administrative state, we have struggled to describe our regula-
tory government as the legitimate child of a constitutional democracy.  That is, we have 
sought to reconcile the administrative state with a constitutional structure that reserves 
important policy decisions for elected officials and not for appointed bureaucrats.”); Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) 
(“The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the le-
gal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution. . . . Faced 
with a choice between the administrative state and the Constitution, the architects of our 
modern government chose the administrative state, and their choice has stuck.” (citation 
omitted)). 
118 See U.S. CONST. art. I–III; THOMAS C. MARKS, JR. & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 190 (2d ed. 2003) (“[A]ll state governments are 
composed of three branches . . . .”).  This is not to say that there are never questions re-
garding whether the conduct of one of the three constitutionally-created branches of 
government is politically legitimate; some of the more interesting and complex issues in 
constitutional law involve questions about the scope and propriety of constitutionally-
allotted government power.  For example, questions about the extent of executive power 
during wartime and of judicial “policymaking” from the bench are common in current 
political discourse.  See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008) (discussing 
the extent of presidential power to hold suspected terrorists during wartime); Jeffrey Ro-
sen, What’s Wrong with Judges Legislating from the Bench?, TIME, July 16, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1910714,00.html (“It’s too bad that 
neither [then-Judge] Sotomayor nor any of the Senators felt at liberty to say [during her 
Supreme Court confirmation hearing] what many scholars and court observers believe to 
be true:  Justices often legislate from the bench, and sometimes that’s a good thing.”).  
The frequency and import of those questions to the functioning of tripartite government, 
however, is not as profound as in the administrative context.  If questions about the polit-
ical legitimacy of congressional or judicial action are not answered definitively by the text 
of the Constitution, they are nonetheless rarely if ever invoked to seriously question the 
democratic validity of the entire institution.  By contrast, the political (i.e., democratic) 
legitimacy of the administrative state is a question that has persisted throughout our ad-
ministrative history, and that is alive and well today in academic commentary about ad-
ministrative law, see Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed:  Against Simple Rules for a 
Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987 (1997) (“Like an intriguing but awkward 
family heirloom, the legitimacy problem is handed down from generation to generation 
of administrative law scholars.”), as well as in law school curricula on the subject.  See 
MICHAEL ASIMOW & RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 10 (3d 
ed. 2009) (“Federal and state constitutions do not usually mention administrative agen-
cies and agency heads are not elected . . . .  As a result, many people question whether the 
exercise of . . . power by agencies is legitimate.”). 
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cratic government.119  As a result, the legitimacy of the administrative 
state has been a source of frequent and contentious debate since its 
inception.120  Arguments about the value of expert and independent 
regulators tackling highly complex and technical problems of mod-
ern government have been countered by concerns over ossification 
and agency capture,121 and a complex doctrine of judicial review has 
developed to counter-balance the wide discretion granted to un-
elected administrators.122  As the size and authority of modern admin-
istrative government expands, these issues have only grown in signi-
ficance.123 
Moreover, administrative law contemplates the blending of tradi-
tionally separate government functions into a single legal entity in a 
way that is otherwise alien to our democratic government.  Constitu-
 
119 See Lawson, supra note 117, at 1231; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation 
After Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 485 (2002) [herei-
nafter Bressman, Disciplining Delegation] (“[Administrative law principles] require agen-
cies in general to articulate a basis for their policy determinations and, in particular, to 
articulate the standards for those determinations.”); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, 
Shifting Sands:  The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1256 
(2004) (“Administrative law aspires to bring reason to agency policymaking.”).  The same 
legitimacy issues exist in the context of state administrative law.  See ASIMOW & LEVIN, su-
pra note 118, at 10. 
120 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 117, at 462. 
121 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1403–07 (1992) (discussing ossification in the rulemaking process); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:  1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 
1059-67, 1060 (1997) (describing the significance of agency capture, the theory that “the 
agency often becomes closely identified with and dependent upon the industry it is 
charged with regulating” in the development of administrative law). 
122 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (outlining the various standards of judicial review for 
“agency action[s], findings, and conclusions”); FINAL REPORT OF THE ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. 
ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE 91 (1941) (explaining that the depth of judicial review depends 
on “[t]he character of the administrative agency, the nature of the problems with which it 
deals, the nature and consequences of the administrative action, the confidence which 
the agency has won, the degree to which the review would interfere with the agency’s 
functions or burden the courts, the nature of the proceedings before the administrative 
agency, and similar factors”); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 320 (1965) (“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition . . . of a 
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”). 
123 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:  Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (“The sheer power wielded by the administrative 
state . . . immediately raises questions about its efficacy and even its political legitimacy.”); 
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1511, 1512 (1992) (“Over the past century, the powers and responsibilities of administra-
tive agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question the constitutional legitimacy 
of the modern federal bureaucracy.”); see also Matt Welch & Nick Gillespie, Op-Ed., 
What’s Next Mr. President—Cardigans?, WASH. POST, July 19, 2009, at B09 (describing the 
federal government’s bailout of the auto industry as “illegal”). 
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tional law124 often compartmentalizes government functions of mak-
ing, executing, and applying the law as a means of maintaining the 
integrity of our political system.125  This approach is not, however, a 
foundational feature of the administrative state.126  Individual agen-
cies are often microcosms of the tripartite government structure de-
signed in the Constitution:  a single legal entity (often with a single 
final decision maker) acts in a legislative (rulemaking), executive (in-
vestigation, enforcement) and judicial (adjudicative) capacity.127  In 
 
124 Constitutional law is used here as the foil for administrative law principles for the simple 
reason that the features of administrative law that are of most interest to this project are 
most closely analogous to issues commonly addressed in constitutional law, such as the 
source, formation, and power of government. 
125 Taken literally, this statement is not uncontroversial.  Although state law tends toward a 
more rigid definition of separation, see MARKS & COOPER, supra note 118, at 189 (explain-
ing that state constitutions “allocate the state’s inherent power to [the] legislature, execu-
tive, and judiciary,” and that unlike the federal constitution, “most state constitutions also 
contain a specific mandate providing for the separation of powers”), the question with 
regard to the federal government is far less clear.  Much has been said about whether the 
separation of powers at the federal level should be understood formalistically to prohibit 
one branch of government from intruding on the prerogatives of another (for example 
whether the judicial branch can “legislate” from the bench), see Peter L. Strauss, The Place 
of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 
577 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, The Place of Agencies] (explaining the formalist approach 
to tripartite government as “suppos[ing] that what government does can be characterized 
in terms of the kind of act performed—legislating, enforcing, and determining the par-
ticular application of law—and that for the safety of the citizenry from tyrannous gov-
ernment these three functions must be kept in distinct places”), or whether a more func-
tionalist approach should be employed, whereby the three constitutional branches 
interact so as to maximize their ability to provide checks and balances against one or 
more branches’ attempts to unduly usurp the rightful authority of another branch.  See id. 
at 578 (describing the functionalist argument for separation of powers as seeking to “pro-
tect the citizens from . . . tyrannical government by establishing multiple heads of author-
ity in government, which are then pitted one against another in a continuous struggle; 
the intent of that struggle is to deny to any one (or two) of them the capacity ever to con-
solidate all governmental authority in itself”).  The resolution of this debate, however, is 
not necessary to the present analysis.  Regardless of how distinct the spheres of constitu-
tional power among the three coordinate branches, the separation of powers at minimum 
“stresses the distinctness of the branches . . . in relation to their ‘core functions.’”  Edward 
Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty:  The Appointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, 
and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1528 (1990) (quoting Peter L. Strauss, The Place 
of Agencies in Government, supra at 578). 
126 See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A 
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 495 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Formal and 
Functional Approaches] (“[T]he years since the Marbury decision have seen the emergence 
of administrative discretion exercised by agencies in all the characteristic forms of go-
vernmental action—legislative, executive, and judicial.”); see also William J. Pohlman, 
Comment, The Continued Viability of Ohio’s Procedure for Legislative Review of Agency Rules in 
the Post-Chadha Era, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 251 (1988) (“[A]dministrative agencies may 
have authority to exercise legislative functions, judicial functions, or both.”). 
127 See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 39, 40 (1937) (describ-
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the context of administrative programs, this means that a program 
designed and administered by an agency could implicate legal issues 
that are unique to administrative law. 
Delegation is among the most prominent of these issues.  Delega-
tion is the process whereby a constitutionally-mandated governmental 
entity acts within its authority to empower another entity to perform a 
function normally reserved to the former.128  Although it centers on 
constitutional concerns about the separation of powers, delegation is 
generally not a prominent issue outside of the administrative law con-
text because delegation between the three constitutionally-mandated 
branches of government129—at least with regard to the “core func-
tions” of those branches—is largely prohibited.130  The legislature 
cannot, for example, empower itself to execute its own laws, nor can 
it empower the President to craft and enact legislation.131  Delegation 
is, however, a fundamental and (somewhat) controversial issue in 
administrative law that asks whether legislators or rule makers132 act 
 
ing administrative agencies as “miniature independent governments”); see also Strauss, 
Formal and Functional Approaches, supra note 126, at 492–93 (“[A]gencies adopt rules hav-
ing the shape and impact of statutes, mold governmental policy through enforcement 
decisions and other initiatives, and decide cases in ways that determine the rights of pri-
vate parties.”). 
128 See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1982) (“The delegation doctrine also has a theoret-
ical application to the transfer of any government power.  The transfer of judicial power 
to executive agencies, of executive power to the legislature, or of legislative power to the 
executive provide examples of this application.” (citations omitted)). 
129 For purposes of this discussion, the three constitutionally-mandated branches (legislative, 
executive, and judicial) are treated as distinct from the oft-described “fourth branch” of 
administrative agencies.  THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., supra note 127, at 
39–40. 
130 Susolik, supra note 125, at 1528 (quoting Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Govern-
ment, supra note 125, at 578). 
131 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding the Line Item Veto Act 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the Presentment Clause); Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that the powers granted to the Comptroller General 
under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act violated the Constitu-
tion’s command that Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws). 
132 Courts have acknowledged the differences between delegation at the legislative and regu-
latory levels, noting that delegation by agency regulators to another component of that 
agency is better understood through administrative, rather than purely constitutional, 
law: 
Judge Williams [in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations] seemed to acknowl-
edge that the application of the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a regulation 
and remand it to the agency was unconventional.  However, he stated, the Su-
preme Court no longer insists on the “strong” form of nondelegation review that 
requires invalidation of standardless statutes.  Rather, he explained, the Supreme 
Court only demands an intelligible principle to set limits on the exercise of admin-
istrative discretion and facilitate judicial review.  Although Congress ordinarily 
supplies the requisite principle, Judge Williams commented, the agency, in the 
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within their constitutional authority when they bestow policy-making 
power on administrative agencies.133  Delegation incorporates basic 
questions about the legitimacy of administrative government and the 
role of separation of powers in our democracy.134 
In short, the choice to apply principles of administrative law in 
evaluating a policy decision reveals questions that are simply beyond 
the scope of the Establishment Clause analyses that have heretofore 
dominated the evolution instruction debate.  Because issues of politi-
cal legitimacy, governmental multitasking, and delegation of policy 
making authority all fit more comfortably into an administrative law 
paradigm, any policy review that includes one or more of these issues 
should be approached with administrative law principles in mind. 
B. Administrative Features of the Distributive Model 
The distributive model has a number of administrative features.  
First, of course, is the technical matter that the model can be prom-
 
exercise of its expert judgment, instead could limit its own discretion.  This ap-
proach, he later observed, fits better with modern doctrines of deference to ad-
ministrative decisions applied in cases like Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. 
  Bressman, Disciplining Delegation, supra note 119, at 456–57 (citations omitted).  For an 
example of intra-agency delegation, see the recently revised Texas state science standards, 
the full text of which is published in Chapter 112 of the Texas Administrative Code. 
133 For purposes of this discussion, delegation is meant in the broadest sense to include del-
egation of both legislative and judicial authority to agencies.  See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n 
v. S. C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 773 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
long ago laid to rest any constitutional doubts about whether the Constitution permitted 
Congress to delegate rulemaking and adjudicative powers to agencies.  That, in part, is 
because the Court established certain safeguards surrounding the exercise of these pow-
ers.” (citations omitted)).  The distinction between these two types of delegation will be 
explored more fully in Part V.B.2, infra. 
134 See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2002) (“The 
delegation phenomenon raises fundamental questions about democracy, accountability, 
and the enterprise of American governance.”).  Compare DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER 
WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 39 
(1993) (citing developments that restricted delegation) and Lawson, supra note 117, at 
1249 (“[T]he most fundamental constitutional problems with modern administrative go-
vernance—unlimited federal power, rampant delegations of legislative authority, and the 
combination of functions in administrators—are not even remotely close cases.”), with 
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE:  USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE 
PUBLIC LAW 134 (1997) (“Since . . . [A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935)] the Supreme Court has not invalidated a single statute on the basis of 
excessive delegation.  This result—surprising, of course, given the history of the doc-
trine—cannot be explained be explained by improvement since 1935 in the drafting of 
statutes.”) and Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 55 (1994) (claiming that, under an originalist interpretation of the 
Constitution, “Congress has wide discretion to vest . . . [administrative powers] in officers 
operating under or beyond the plenary power of the President”).   
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ulgated by administrative agencies, typically at the state and local lev-
el.135  This in and of itself is not a significant departure from previous 
evolution policies, nor is it necessarily the case; there is nothing inhe-
rent in the distributive model that precludes it from being part of a 
statutory mandate, and in fact many of the policy measures incorpo-
rating the model are statutes.136  At best, then, the fact that it could be 
the work of an administrative agency is instructive, but far from dis-
positive, in helping to comprehend why the distributive model is best 
understood through application of administrative law principles. 
Another basis for thinking about the distributive model in admin-
istrative terms is its grounding in scientific conflict.137  While it is a leg-
islature’s prerogative to legislate on any topic within its constitutional 
power,138 it is a founding principle of administrative law that agencies 
staffed with experienced experts in a particular field are better 
equipped to make complex, technical judgments in that field.139  In 
the case of evolution instruction and the distributive model in partic-
ular, there are overlapping areas of relevant expertise.  Experience 
and technical knowledge must be brought to bear in the fields of 
education and science, with the latter requiring an understanding of 
the current state of scientific opinion about the origins of human be-
ings on Earth.140  While this may not be entirely beyond the capacity 
 
135 The full text of Texas’ revised state science standards is published in Chapter 112 of Title 
19 of the Texas Administrative Code. 
136 In fact, the Louisiana Science Education Act institutes the distributive model as a matter 
of state statutory law.  See Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17:285.1.B(1) (2008).  Although it does call for regulations to be promulgated to im-
plement the provisions of the Act, see Bulletin 741-Louisiana Handbook for School Ad-
ministrators, Curriculum and Instruction, Science Education 35:8 La. Reg. 1476 (Aug. 20, 
2009), Louisiana’s policy regime for evolution instruction is essentially a matter of state 
statute. 
137 One commentator described the new Texas science standards as “expanding the attacks 
beyond evolution to include scientific expertise itself.”  Rosenau, supra note 5, at 1. 
138 See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (“[T]he sovereignty of Congress, 
though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects.”). 
139 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938) (“With the rise of regula-
tion, the need for expertness became dominant . . . .”); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation 
in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1252 (1986) (“As in its initial phase, the 
New Deal continued its propensity to address particularized areas of unrest through regu-
lation by experts . . . .”); id. at 1266 (“With the final legitimation of the New Deal came 
the acceptance of a central precept of public administration:  faith in the ability of ex-
perts to develop effective solutions . . . .”).  Recently, Professors Freeman and Vermeule 
have noted the Supreme Court’s support for the importance of agency expertise.  See Jody 
Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA:  From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. 
CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007) (noting “the Court majority’s [in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 
497 (2007)] increasing worries about the politicization of administrative expertise”). 
140 See supra notes 97–98, 107–08 and accompanying text (outlining the current debate over 
the distributive model of evolution instruction, in which proponents of the distributive 
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of legislators, it certainly appears better suited to administrative, ra-
ther than legislative, treatment.141 
Administrative law principles are also implicated by the distribu-
tive model’s decision-making regime.  The distributive model is dis-
tinct from the evolution instruction policies that preceded it because 
the distributive model does not provide educators with a wide-
reaching mandate regarding how to approach questions of human 
origins.142  Instead, it states a series of principles about scientific ex-
amination and integrity in the classroom and shifts the ultimate deci-
sion of how to handle issues pertaining to the veracity or exclusivity of 
evolutionary theory to educators on a local, individualized basis.143  
This is an important change from prior evolution instruction policy 
and is perhaps the strongest support for treating the distributive 
model as an administrative endeavor.  The generalized mandates that 
preceded the distributive model fit neatly into the legislative and/or 
rulemaking paradigm; prohibitions on teaching evolution, balanced 
treatment legislation, and evolution disclaimers were all generalized 
prescriptions regarding evolution instruction.144 
The distributive model, by contrast, operates entirely differently.  
It begins with a statutory or regulatory framework that transfers poli-
cy-making authority to individual educators, who are then expected 
 
model contend that evolutionary theory is vulnerable to scientific critique, while its op-
ponents argue that there is no legitimate scientific controversy regarding the veracity of 
Darwinian evolution). 
141 Professor DelFattore contends that as early as the “middle of the nineteenth century,” 
scientific questions accompanying evolutionary theory had become too technically com-
plex for nonscientists (including talented leaders and politicians like Wilberforce and 
Gladstone) to debate on an even footing with scientists.  DelFattore, supra note 18, at 32 
(citing JAMES R. MOORE, THE POST-DARWINIAN CONTROVERSIES:  A STUDY OF THE 
PROTESTANT STRUGGLE TO COME TO TERMS WITH DARWIN IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA 
1870-1900 213 (1979); GEORGE E. WEBB, THE EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY IN AMERICA 1, 64 
(1994)). 
142 See discussion supra Part III (describing the distributive model). 
143 See discussion supra notes 87–88, 110–11 and accompanying text. 
144 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98 & n.3 (1968) (invalidating “Initiated Act 
No. 1, Ark. Acts 1929; Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628 (1960 Repl. Vol.),” which pro-
hibits “a teacher in any state-supported school or university ‘to teach the theory or doc-
trine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower order of animals,’ or ‘to adopt 
or use in any such institution a textbook that teaches’ this theory”); see also Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987) (invalidating the Louisiana Balanced Treatment for 
Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act, LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 17:286.1–17:286.7, which “forbids the teaching of the theory of evolution in pub-
lic schools unless accompanied by instruction in ‘creation science’”); Kitzmiller v. Dover 
Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (striking a requirement that 
school officials read a statement to ninth grade science students that evolution is “not a 
fact,” and that “[g]aps in the theory exist for which there is no evidence”). 
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to apply generalized legislative or regulatory instructions to reach 
more specific conclusions about how to educate their students about 
evolution.  This form of policy making displays a common feature of 
administrative law:  it empowers educators to operate on a continuum 
between quasi-legislative (regulatory) and quasi-judicial (adjudica-
tive) policy making that is generally not permitted in any of the three 
constitutionally-mandated branches of government.145  Put another 
way, the distributive model is best understood by reference to admin-
istrative law doctrine because it implicates the fundamental relation-
ship in administrative law between rules and orders.146 
Although important to our understanding of administrative law, 
the distinction between rulemaking and adjudication can be difficult 
to identify in practice.147  Rules are defined in federal and state ad-
ministrative law as prospective, generally-applicable prescriptions that 
 
145 See discussion supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
146 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), (6) (2006) (originally enacted as Administrative Procedure Act of 
1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237) (defining rules and orders under the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT, 1981 ACT, § 1-102(5), (10) 
(1990).  Professor Fuchs recognized the importance of the distinction between rules and 
orders at the outset of the administrative state: 
Administrative rule-making is one type of function performed by administrative 
agencies.  The procedural problems attending the exercise of this function are to 
some extent distinct from those which surround the performance of other admin-
istrative acts, such as decisions and orders addressed to particular individu-
als . . . . Rule-making, sometimes referred to as “administrative legislation,” and a 
companion function, often called “administrative adjudication,” have become 
primary categories in the study of administrative law. 
  Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 259 (1938).  
He went on to explain that: 
The most obvious definition of rule-making . . . asserts simply that it is the function 
of laying down general regulations as distinguished from orders that apply to 
named persons or to specific situations.  Most acts of legislatures . . . establish 
rights and duties with respect either to people generally or to classes of people or 
situations that are defined but not enumerated.  Conversely, the judgments of 
courts usually are addressed to particular individuals or to situations that are defi-
nitely specified.  Similarly, administrative action can be classified into general reg-
ulations, including determinations whose effect is to bring general regulations in-
to operation, and orders or acts of specific application. 
  Id. at 263 (citations omitted). 
147 The characterization of administrative activity as rulemaking or adjudication has been a 
source of consistent controversy among courts and commentators.  See, e.g., JOHN 
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
19–20 (1927) (“The whole discussion [about the rule-order distinction] should go to 
demonstrate the futility of trying to classify a particular exercise of administrative power 
as either wholly legislative or wholly judicial.  The tendency of the administrative proce-
dure is to foreshorten both functions into a continuous governmental act.”); PETER L. 
STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW:  CASES AND COMMENTS 248–251 (10th ed. 2003) (collecting materials “that bear on 
the question of how the [rule-order] distinction is, as a general matter, to be drawn, and 
on the difficulties in doing so”). 
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are developed in accordance with procedures designed to promote 
public participation and transparency.148  Orders, by contrast, are the 
product of adjudication, are dispositions “of particular applicability 
determining the rights of specific parties on the basis of their special 
circumstances,” and are understood as binding only those parties.149  
Depending on how it is put into action, the distributive model 
represents a range of administrative activity that can at times be de-
scribed as either rulemaking or adjudication.  An examination of two 
permissible yet very different approaches to implementing the distri-
butive model demonstrates this point. 
In the first approach, a teacher responds to a specific request 
from a student asking her to address some part of the evolution de-
bate by being critical of evolutionary theory.  The teacher’s decision 
in this example is ad hoc, retrospective, and designed to affect only a 
particular group of people.  It fits nicely within the definition of an 
order and has the added benefit of satisfying our instinctive under-
standing of an adjudicative decision in that it is focused on a specific, 
pre-existing conflict or inquiry. 
The second approach, however, demonstrates the difficulty in 
classifying the distributive model as purely regulatory or adjudicative.  
In this approach, a teacher decides on her own initiative—without 
encountering any inquiries or concerns from students about the ve-
racity of evolutionary theory—to design a lesson plan highlighting 
the “weaknesses” in evolutionary theory and to implement that lesson 
plan in her science classes from that point on.  On its face, her deci-
sion looks like a rule:  it is prospective, applicable to all current and 
future students, and is not aimed at an existing conflict.  On the oth-
er hand, the decision could be said to fail as a rule, and thus be better 
described as an order, for a number of reasons.  Although it is tech-
nically prospective, the decision remains so primarily in the mind of 
the individual instructor.  She has no explicit authority under the 
model to promulgate any lasting, formal changes to the curriculum, 
in her classroom or otherwise, going forward.  Her decision is also 
generally applicable only in context; it affects only those students in 
her classroom, and only while they are required to be in her class-
 
148 See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 192–94; see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), 553 (defining a 
“rule” and describing informal rulemaking procedures under the federal Administrative 
Procedure Act); MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 1-102(5) (defining rules for use 
in state administrative law systems). 
149 See Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking 
Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 122 (1990); see also ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 
8 (discussing adjudication in state and federal administrative law); MODEL STATE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1981 ACT, §1-102(10) (1990) (defining orders). 
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room.  The characterization of the teacher’s decision as generally ap-
plicable thus depends on whether the decision’s impact is measured 
in relation to the teacher’s own jurisdiction, her classroom, or a larg-
er group of students in, for example, the school as a whole, the 
school district, or the entire state.  Moreover, although the process by 
which the teacher arrived at her hypothetical decision was the prod-
uct of a procedurally valid statute or regulation, it does not itself con-
tain any of the procedural protections associated with even infor-
mal—let alone formal—rulemaking under the APA and similar state 
statutes.150  In short, this second approach to implementing the distri-
butive model leaves much room for debate as to whether a teacher’s 
decision is better described as a rule or an order. 
These two examples are not intended to resolve the question of 
whether the distributive model represents a primarily regulatory or 
adjudicative regime, but instead to demonstrate that, while the im-
plementation of the distributive model may not represent a paradig-
matic example of either adjudication or rulemaking in every instance, 
the range of decision-making authority available to teachers under 
the model at minimum reflects the multi-dimensional nature of poli-
cy making that is endemic to administrative law. 
Still another relevant feature of the distributive model is its dele-
gation of authority by legislators or regulators to individual educators 
to act as local, relatively autonomous evolution instruction policy 
makers.151  The Discovery Institute’s Model Academic Freedom Statute 
grants “every K-12 public school teacher . . . or instructor . . . the af-
firmative right and freedom to present scientific information pertain-
ing to the full range of scientific views regarding biological and chem-
ical evolution,”152 but nowhere suggests how, or whether those rights 
should be exercised.  Similar language appears in the Louisiana and 
Texas enactments,153 and confirms that the distributive model is a 
delegation of decision making authority from the state legislature or 
 
150 See 5 U.S.C. § 553, 556–57 (describing procedures for formal and informal rulemaking 
under the federal APA); MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 3-101 et seq. 
(describing rulemaking procedures). 
151 See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA, REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1(B)(1) (2008) 
(requiring only that the State Board “allow and assist” teachers to promote “critical think-
ing” about evolution in their classrooms). 
152 MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 84, § 3.  
153 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(2) (defining the assistance available to educators as 
“support and guidance for teachers regarding effective ways to help stu-
dents . . . critique . . . scientific theories . . . including [evolution]”); 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 112.34(c)(7) (2009) (explaining that students are “expected to” think critically about 
evolutionary concepts, but not specifying which materials or methods should be used to 
promote such critical thinking). 
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education board to individual science teachers to determine how 
specific issues regarding the teaching of evolution will be resolved in 
specific instances.154  Where authority is delegated from one adminis-
trative entity to another, such as in Texas’ new standards, the case for 
treating the issue in terms of its relationship with administrative law is 
even more compelling.155 
C. The Distributive Model and the Establishment Clause 
The argument for viewing the distributive model through the lens 
of administrative law is not only based on the positive correlation be-
tween the two.  It is also supported by the fact that the Establishment 
Clause—the traditionally exclusive vehicle for judicial review of evolu-
tion instruction issues156—is somewhat ill-equipped to perform that 
function with respect to the distributive model.  The standards used 
by federal courts to analyze evolution instruction cases under the Es-
tablishment Clause depend upon identifying a religious purpose or 
effect within the statute or policy measure under review.  The Lemon 
test, which is still the primary authority cited by courts in evolution 
instruction cases,157 invalidates only those statutes with a solely secta-
rian purpose or a primary religious effect.158  The legislative motiva-
 
154 Delegation in this case is used to refer broadly to delegation of legislative as well as judi-
cial authority to administrative actors.  Further discussion of delegation in the distributive 
model is taken up in Part V.B.2, infra. 
155 Professor Bressman noted that the appellate court thought as much in Whitman v. Ameri-
can Trucking Ass’ns: 
Judge Williams [in Whitman] seemed to acknowledge that the application of the 
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a regulation and remand it to the agency was 
unconventional. . . . Although Congress ordinarily supplies the requisite principle, 
Judge Williams commented, the agency, in the exercise of its expert judgment, in-
stead could limit its own discretion.  This approach, he later observed, fits better 
with modern doctrines of deference to administrative decisions . . . . 
  Bressman, Disciplining Delegation, supra note 119, at 456–57. 
156 See discussion supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
157 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (declining to abandon the Lemon test 
as the primary doctrinal framework in applying the Establishment Clause); see also Pager, 
supra note 15, at 32 (describing the Lemon test as the “dominant framework for analyzing 
school-religion interactions under the First Amendment”).  But see id. at 890 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (describing the Lemon test as “discredited”).   
158 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that in order to survive 
Establishment Clause scrutiny, a statute must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a prin-
ciple or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion). 
   The excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test is not discussed further here for 
two reasons.  First, it has been described by various members of the Court in recent opi-
nions as being reduced to “an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect,” Agostini v. Fel-
ton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997), and as being “recast . . . as simply one criterion relevant to 
determining a statute’s effect.”  Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807–08 (2000) (Thomas, 
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tion standard, which played a prominent role in balanced treatment 
cases,159 depends upon a showing that lawmakers’ primary purpose 
was to promote religion.160  The endorsement test was the courts’ pre-
ferred standard in more recent cases dealing with facially neutral evo-
lution disclaimers and the intelligent design debate, and is thus the 
standard most likely to be applied in reviewing the distributive mod-
el.161  It prohibits statutes that create the appearance, in the eyes of a 
reasonable objective observer, of government endorsement of reli-
gion or favoritism toward religious believers.162  These standards are 
 
J., writing for plurality).  By that account, discussion of the effects prong of Lemon is suffi-
cient.  Second, even if excessive institutional entanglement with religion were still treated 
as dispositive under the Lemon test, the distributive model is too indeterminate to meet 
this standard.  Because it says nothing on its face about religion and does not require that 
the state do anything with regard to evolution instruction, it is virtually impossible to de-
pict the permissive language of the distributive model as entangling the state with any-
thing, let alone doing so excessively and with respect to religion.  Where unconstitutional 
entanglements have been found, they have frequently been in cases where religious insti-
tutions received government funding and conditions on receipt of government funds or 
compliance reviews associated with the granting of those funds resulted in intimate gov-
ernment involvement with a religious institution.  See Stephen M. Feldman, Divided We 
Fall:  Religion, Politics, and the Lemon Entanglements Prong, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 253, 269 
(2009) (“Even in those first years after Lemon . . . administrative entanglement quickly 
assumed a position of prominence, as the justices focused on governmental surveillance 
and control over religious schools in a variety of public funding scenarios.”).  That is 
simply not the case with the distributive model. 
159 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana’s balanced 
treatment statute); McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (in-
validating Arkansas’ balanced treatment statute). 
160 See, e.g., Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587, 591–93 & nn.12–14 (citing in support of its decision to 
invalidate Louisiana’s balanced treatment statute language in the legislative history indi-
cating that the promotion of the biblical account of creationism was the motivating force 
behind the act); McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1261, 1263 (invalidating balanced treatment sta-
tute because the statute was found to be part of a “religious crusade . . . motivated by [an] 
opposition to the theory of evolution and [a] desire to see [creationism] taught in the 
public schools”). 
161 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 745 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Selman v. 
Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (N.D. Ga. 2005); see Freiler v. Tangipahoa Pa-
rish Bd. of Educ., 975 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. La. 1997), aff’d, 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), 
reh’g denied, 201 F.3d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 
530 U.S. 1251 (2000). 
162 See, e.g., Selman, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1305 (describing the endorsement test as prohibiting 
any statement that, when viewed by a reasonable observer who is familiar with the state-
ment’s historic and cultural context, conveys a message of government endorsement of 
religion (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984))).  But see Kristi L. Bowman, Seeing 
Government Purpose Through the Objective Observer’s Eyes:  The Evolution-Intelligent Design De-
bates, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 461 (2006) (contending that the Supreme Court in 
McCreary County conflated the purpose and effects test of Lemon and “adopted the pers-
pective of the reasonable observer to evaluate not only whether a statute or policy has the 
effect of creating an apparent endorsement of religion, but also whether that statute or 
policy was motivated by an impermissible government purpose”). 
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not only substantively limited in their ability to deal with facially neu-
tral, indeterminate policies like the distributive model,163 but are una-
ble to accommodate the breadth of political and constitutional issues 
that the model implicates. 
Antievolutionist policies have become increasingly secular in their 
language and their stated purpose,164 and the distributive model is no 
exception.  In addition to remaining facially neutral with regard to 
religion, the model incorporates a lesson from recent evolution dis-
claimer cases of limiting its stated purpose and legislative history to 
discussions of scientific complexity and uncertainty.165  Despite being 
supported by organizations that are veterans of antievolutionist poli-
tics and, in many cases, creationists,166 the distributive model does not 
make any positive mention of religion167 and in fact is careful to ex-
plain that its only motivation is to promote scientific integrity, not the 
 
163 In a previous article, I argued that Establishment Clause doctrine is consistently under-
inclusive, over-inclusive, or both in its treatment of facially neutral, indeterminate policies 
like the distributive model.  See Virelli, Making Lemonade, supra note 115. 
164 See supra Parts II.B, III.  This is in large part the result of a series of judicial decisions inva-
lidating policy measures advocated by evolution opponents.  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
(describing the development of evolution instruction policy); see also Ravitch, supra note 
12, at 852 (explaining that the Court’s decision in Epperson “led to the ‘creation science’ 
movement,” and “[a]s creationism begat creation science, creation science would soon 
beget a much more powerful offspring, Intelligent Design”); id. at 896 (“The form that 
the current [Intelligent Design] movement has taken is primarily a response to cases de-
cided under the Establishment Clause.”). 
165 See, e.g., MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 84, § 7 (“Noth-
ing in this act shall be construed as promoting any religious doctrine, promoting discrim-
ination for or against a particular set of religious beliefs, or promoting discrimination for 
or against religion or non-religion.”); Texas Improves on Strengths and Weaknesses Language 
in Science Standards on Teaching Evolution, supra note 74 (“‘Texas now has the most pro-
gressive science standards on evolution in the entire nation . . . .  Contrary to the claims 
of the evolution lobby, absolutely nothing the Board did promotes “creationism” or reli-
gion in the classroom.  Groups that assert otherwise are lying, plain and simple.’” (quot-
ing Dr. John West, Senior Fellow at the Discovery Institute)); Memorandum from Paul G. 
Pastorek, La. State Dep’t of Educ., to City, Parish, and other Local Sch. Superintendents 
et al., supra note 98 (“The legislative intent is explicitly stated that [the Louisiana Science 
Education Act] shall not be construed to promote any religious doctrine, promote dis-
crimination for or against a particular set of religious beliefs, or promote discrimination 
for or against religion or non-religion.”). 
166 The model academic freedom bill is the work of the Discovery Institute’s Center for 
Science and Culture.  See MODEL ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 
84. 
167 Indeed, the Model Statute explicitly states that “[n]othing in this act shall be construed as 
promoting any religious doctrine, promoting discrimination for or against a particular set 
of religious beliefs, or promoting discrimination for or against religion or non-religion.”  
Id. § 7; see also Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.D (2008) 
(stating that the Act “shall not be construed to promote any religious doctrine”). 
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advancement of any religious doctrine.168  Independent of whether 
the distributive model’s claim of religious neutrality is sincere, the re-
ality for reviewing courts is that facially neutral statutes—in particular 
those, like the distributive model, that are careful to maintain the ap-
pearance of neutrality not just in the final statutory or regulatory lan-
guage but throughout all phases of the legislative process—present 
greater complications under the Establishment Clause than facially 
sectarian ones.  As a result, the distributive model’s omission of reli-
gious language from not only the text of the enactment but from any 
supporting discussion thereof helps distance the model from the 
reach of existing Establishment Clause doctrine.169 
A far greater problem than the distributive model’s facial neutrali-
ty for reviewing courts under the Establishment Clause is the model’s 
lack of determinacy.  It is this lack of determinacy that represents the 
distributive model’s greatest departure from previous antievolutionist 
policies regarding evolution instruction, including the facially neutral 
disclaimers in Selman and Kitzmiller.  Unlike those disclaimers, which 
mandated how certain statements about evolution were to be pre-
sented to students, the distributive model is premised on being per-
missive; it facilitates local educators’ ability to confront evolution 
questions at their own (presumably antievolutionist) discretion.170  
This approach further removes the distributive model from the range 
of analysis reasonably available under the Establishment Clause.  Be-
cause the distributive model does not require a particular outcome in 
the treatment of evolution questions, it becomes exceedingly difficult 
 
168 Even the distributive model’s primary advocate, the Discovery Institute’s Center for 
Science and Culture, has changed its publicly stated purpose for taking issue with evolu-
tion education.  In 1999, the Discovery Institute’s Center for Science and Culture pro-
duced a document outlining a five-year strategy for combating evolution instruction in 
which it described as its purpose “to reverse the stifling dominance of the materialist 
worldview [including evolution theory], and to replace it with a science consonant with 
Christian and theistic convictions.”  See DISCOVERY INST., Wedge Strategy, supra note 58, at 2.  
Ten years later, the same organization describes its mission as “encourag[ing] schools to 
improve science education by teaching students more fully about the theory of evolution, 
including the theory’s scientific weaknesses as well is its strengths.”  DISCOVERY INST. CTR. 
SCI. & CULTURE, supra note 58. 
169 See Virelli, Making Lemonade, supra note 115 (arguing that modern Establishment Clause 
doctrine cannot adequately accommodate facially neutral evolution instruction policies); 
Charles Kitcher, Note, Lawful Design:  A New Standard for Evaluating Establishment Clause 
Challenges to School Science Curricula, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 492–93 (2006) 
(contending that “the best hope of passing constitutional muster . . . would be a curricu-
lum measure that did not go beyond requiring a critical presentation of evolution”). 
170 See discussion supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the importance to the 
distributive model of decision making by individual educators, rather than agencies such 
as school boards). 
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to ascribe any particular purpose or consequence to it or its drafters, 
let alone a religious one.  It is likewise very hard to measure the mod-
el’s overall effect on the community when its application in the class-
room remains uncertain.  Facial Establishment Clause challenges to 
the model will thus be difficult to sustain.  Even as-applied challenges 
to the distributive model are problematic under the Establishment 
Clause, as the challenge of determining whether an individual educa-
tor introduced an alternative to evolution in the classroom for a reli-
gious or other purpose remains, at best, elusive.  Unlike policy meas-
ures formulated on the record through a deliberative political 
process, the decisions of individual educators will likely not be ac-
companied by documented comments or arguments supporting a 
particular conclusion.  Absent an admission by the educator that she 
was religiously motivated, the only sources of information for a court 
entertaining an as-applied Establishment Clause challenge to an edu-
cator’s decision under the distributive model will be circumstantial 
evidence of motive, which is by definition difficult to decipher,171 or a 
hypothetical exercise in deductive reasoning to determine what con-
clusions a reasonable observer would make as to the decision’s im-
pact on the community.172  Beyond the fact that determining the ob-
jective impact of a decision on an entire community relies on a 
number of highly subjective factors such as defining the reasonable 
observer and the depth of information attributable to that observer,173 
the use of as-applied challenges to the distributive model is signifi-
cantly more costly and time-consuming than a single facial challenge, 
making the Establishment Clause an even less attractive vehicle for 
plaintiffs challenging the policy on an as-applied basis. 
 
171 See, e.g., McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (applying 
the legislative motivation standard to an issue of evolution instruction). 
172 Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 390 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (applying 
the endorsement test to invalidate an evolution disclaimer because it conveyed the mes-
sage that those who “oppose evolution for religious reasons . . . are favored members of 
the political community”).  There is also the unlikely possibility that a student or some 
other witness will provide first-hand evidence of a teacher’s motivations, for instance via 
taping (which would require a significant amount of foresight and planning on behalf of 
the witness) or testifying to specific statements made by the instructor that betray their 
reasons for introducing information critical of evolution in the classroom.  Although 
perhaps more likely than a confession, the probability that a religiously motivated teacher 
would admit as much in the classroom is too small to render an Establishment Clause 
challenge an effective way to address potentially problematic policy decisions by individu-
al educators. 
173 See Schuneman, supra note 6, at 215–16 (noting inherent weaknesses of the endorsement 
test in dealing with evolution instruction issues); Virelli, Making Lemonade, supra note 
115, at 443 & n.99 (outlining “the weaknesses in the endorsement test”). 
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This is not to say that the Establishment Clause or, more specifi-
cally, the endorsement test is rendered obsolete or otherwise inappo-
site by the distributive model; courts are not likely to simply abandon 
their recent practice of applying the endorsement test in cases involv-
ing evolution instruction, and in certain factual circumstances 
(where, for example, a sectarian motivation is clearly evident in the 
model’s legislative history) that approach could prove perfectly ade-
quate for revealing constitutional infirmities.  It is nevertheless im-
portant to note that the distributive model’s approach to evolution 
instruction has the affect of muddying the relevant Establishment 
Clause analyses such that additional analytical tools for evaluating the 
model are needed. 
As a consequence of evolution instruction policies becoming in-
creasingly removed from an explicit conflict between evolution and 
creationism, courts attempting to evaluate those policies under the 
Establishment Clause have been forced to try and fit the square peg 
of facially neutral legislation defended on scientific grounds into the 
round holes of religious purpose and effect.174  Although this dilem-
ma has yet to persuade a court to uphold an antievolutionist meas-
ure,175 it has created a situation where a dynamic and broadening area 
of public policy is being reviewed through a relatively static and nar-
row lens.  Apart from whether religion is in fact the driving force be-
hind the ongoing evolution instruction debate,176 the political and le-
gal contexts in which that debate is actually conducted are too broad 
to be treated as a single constitutional issue.177 
 
174 See discussion supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text. 
175 See, e.g., Casey Luskin, Does Challenging Darwin Create Constitutional Jeopardy?  A Comprehen-
sive Survey of Case Law Regarding the Teaching of Biological Origins, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 5 
(2009) (noting “that the courts have . . . ‘consistently supported the teaching of evolu-
tion’”). 
176 See supra Part II (discussing the doctrinal history of the evolution instruction debate as 
focusing solely on the issue of religious establishment). 
177 One possible approach would be to reconsider the scope of current Establishment Clause 
doctrine to accommodate concerns that even the distributive model is at its core the 
product of attempts by lawmakers to facilitate the presentation of religious theories of 
human origins in science classes.  While this approach may certainly be worthwhile, and 
has been addressed in previous publications by the author, see Virelli, Making Lemonade, 
supra note 115, it is not mutually exclusive with the animating position for this Article, 
namely that the distributive model is better viewed in the context of administrative law 
principles. 
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V.  NEW ISSUES UNDER THE DISTRIBUTIVE MODEL 
After decades of legal battles waged on the familiar ground of the 
Establishment Clause, evolution instruction policy has diversified 
from straightforward conflicts about religion in public school class-
rooms.  The new face of antievolutionist policy, the distributive mod-
el, is better analogized to a complicated regulatory regime than a leg-
islative prescription.  This is significant not only because it constitutes 
a sea-change in perspective on the evolution instruction debate, but 
also because it avoids the analytical brambles presented by efforts to 
confront questions relating to administrative law on purely religious 
grounds.  Approaching the distributive model in its natural habitat as 
an administrative measure captures new and important political and 
legal issues at no expense to considerations of the Establishment 
Clause, whatever its continuing relevance. 
A.  Political Legitimacy 
The first of these issues is the political legitimacy of the distribu-
tive model, both at the statutory/regulatory level where authority is 
transferred to individual educators to make decisions about what 
should be taught and in the classrooms where those decisions are ac-
tually made.178  Political legitimacy depends on agencies and their 
 
178 At the statutory level, access to accurate and reliable technical information about the cur-
rent scientific understanding of human origins is important to standard-setting; the very 
idea of encouraging educators to promote critical thinking about any scientific proposi-
tion can only be legitimate where a legitimate scientific critique is available, i.e., if a dis-
pute about human origins exists that is grounded in a scientific discipline.  Where rea-
sonable scientists each employ the scientific method to reach distinct conclusions, then 
legislation or regulation relying on the existence of such a conflict can be considered—at 
least in terms of its scientific features—legitimate.  By contrast, where policy positions 
based on presenting students with a scientific critique of evolution cannot be explained 
by reference to reliable scientific information advocating for such a policy, its legitimacy 
naturally falls into question.  By the same token, the legitimacy of decisions by individual 
educators in individual classrooms depends on those educators having access to reliable 
scientific information in order to validate their specific decisions regarding how to pro-
mote critical thinking about evolution.  Those decisions are rendered arbitrary, and thus 
illegitimate, where their critique fails to reflect sound science.  Therefore, although the 
implications of these individual determinations being made in a politically illegitimate 
way are far less severe than those at the legislative, standard-setting level, the legitimacy of 
individual educators’ policy making function must nonetheless also depend on the quali-
ty of the technical information informing those decisions.  Due to the fact that political 
legitimacy in both the legislative and classroom contexts of the distributive model de-
pends on the reliability of scientific information being used to support those policy deci-
sions, a broader discussion of the model’s political legitimacy is possible without continu-
ing reference to these two distinct levels of policy making.  This does not mean that the 
potential safeguards against illegitimate application of the distributive model do not vary 
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representatives providing reasoned explanations for their decisions.179  
In the case of the distributive model, the explanations provided in 
support are all based on claims of scientific uncertainty regarding the 
capacity of evolution to explain human origins.180  Detractors suggest 
that no such uncertainty exists and that supporters’ reliance on a 
scientific controversy is a pretext for inserting religious ideology into 
the classroom.181  Regardless of which side has the better of the de-
bate, the dispute about the strength of the explanation for the distri-
butive model invites a question about the model’s political legitimacy 
that is distinct from whether it represents an unconstitutional estab-
lishment of religion.182 
This broad question about the distributive model’s legitimacy can 
be subdivided into questions of how to determine whether the policy 
as it exists is legitimate and, if not, how to make it so.  The founda-
tional principles affecting administrative legitimacy are expertise, ac-
countability, efficiency, and consistency.183  Each is strongly impli-
 
based on whether the model’s legislative or individual policy-making feature is at issue, 
but only that we may assume, for present purposes, that the political legitimacy of every 
application of the distributive model depends on the reliability of the scientific know-
ledge informing that process. 
179 See Bressman, Disciplining Delegation, supra note 119, at 485 (“[Administrative law prin-
ciples] require agencies in general to articulate a basis for their policy determinations 
and, in particular, to articulate the standards for those determinations.”); Cary Coglia-
nese & Gary E. Marchant, supra note 119, at 1256 (“Administrative law aspires to bring 
reason to agency policymaking.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are 
Put in a Jar:  Reasons and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 24 
(2001). 
180 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. 
181 See supra notes 97–107 and accompanying text. 
182 If the scientific controversy explanation is found to be adequate to support the distribu-
tive model, there is still room to contend that the policy, although not necessarily de-
signed solely to promote religion, could run afoul of another standard under the Estab-
lishment Clause, such as the endorsement test.  See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 
573, 597 (1989) (defining the endorsement test:  “when evaluating the effect of govern-
ment conduct under the Establishment Clause, we must ascertain whether ‘the chal-
lenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the con-
trolling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of 
their individual religious choices.’” (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390, 
(1985))).  On the other hand, if the explanation is found to be inadequate to support the 
distributive model as a legitimate exercise of government power under the separation of 
powers, the question of establishment of religion is moot, but not resolved.  In either 
event, an inquiry into the legitimacy of the distributive model is independent, and in no 
way exclusive, of Establishment Clause concerns. 
183 See Jost Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State:  Transnational Democracy and/or 
Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 34 (2003) (“[W]e 
find several elements and criteria that are held to contribute to the legitimacy of the ex-
ercise of public authority. . . . [S]uch criteria are transparency and efficiency of govern-
ment (or more broadly, public authority), and actions and accountability . . . .  Finally, we 
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cated in policy environments like the distributive model where scien-
tific issues are central to the policy’s political justification.  Agency 
expertise is necessary to make the scientific judgment about the re-
liability of evolutionary theory that drives the distributive model’s pol-
icy outcome.184  Accountability, which includes as a prerequisite 
transparency,185 refers to the public’s ability to retain control over its 
government by judging its representatives’ performance in office.186  
 
may add expertise as a factor that can contribute to the acceptability of acts of public au-
thorities.”); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 102–103 
(1985) (pointing to the courts’ due process analysis after 1970 as promising “transparen-
cy, generality, and simplicity . . . it made the guarantee of due process a guarantee of ac-
curate and cost-effective decision making”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION:  RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 242–44 (1990) (stating that “politi-
cal accountability” is a foundational constitutional principle with regard to statutory in-
terpretation); Harold J. Krent, Reviewing Agency Action for Inconsistency with Prior Rules and 
Regulations, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1187, 1212 (1997) (“First, when agencies have limited 
their own discretion, review can help ensure that the agency treat similarly situated indi-
viduals equivalently, a fundamental principle of public law.  Review for consistency furth-
ers the ideal of agency legitimacy.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 94 (“The Vest-
ing Clause of Article II—by placing the executive in one rather than many presidents—
embodied this judgment.  It is therefore clear that the constitutional text and structure 
reflect commitments to the unitary virtues of coordination, accountability, and efficiency 
in government.”). 
184 Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., con-
curring) (noting the existence of “cases of great technological complexity” in administra-
tive law); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 99–100 (“To be sure, many insist on tech-
nocratic rationality—on the importance of expertise in helping people to make informed 
judgments about the relations between means and ends.  This is an enduring theme in 
administrative law. . . . [T]he absence of expertise, or the distortion of expert judgment 
through anecdote and interest-group power, is an important obstacle to a well-
functioning system of regulatory law.” (citations omitted)).  Although most pronounced 
in the technocratic model of administrative law that arose during the New Deal, see 
LANDIS, supra note 139, at 23 (“With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness be-
came dominant . . . .”); Rabin, supra note 139, at 1252 (“As in its initial phase, the New 
Deal continued its propensity to address particularized areas of unrest through regulation 
by experts . . . .”), expertise remains a critical feature of any theory of administrative go-
vernance.  Even public choice or “civic republican” theory, which relies on the resolution 
of competing interests and viewpoints rather than the opinions of particular experts to 
set policy, requires access to reliable information to better inform those interests and po-
sitions.  See generally Croley, supra note 123; Seidenfeld, supra note 123, at 1512. 
185 Molly Beutz, Functional Democracy:  Responding to Failures of Accountability, 44 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 387, 428 (2003) (describing transparency as a “precondition” to accountability and 
explaining that “[t]ransparency and access to information facilitate accountability be-
cause citizens need information to know when to hold which leaders accountable for 
what decisions”); Mark Fenster, The Opacity Of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 899 
(2006) (“The most significant consequences [of government transparency] flow from the 
public’s increased ability to monitor government activity and hold offi-
cials . . . accountable for their actions.”). 
186 Professor Bressman describes the principle of accountability as follows: 
Perhaps the best understanding of accountability is not that it requires elected of-
ficials to make policy decisions simply because they are responsive to the people.  
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In order for the public to make that judgment in the administrative 
context, it must be privy to an administrative policy maker’s explana-
tions for their exercise of authority, and those explanations must be 
rational and well-informed.  This is especially true where, as with the 
distributive model, the explanations are scientific in nature; technical 
explanations are more difficult for the lay public to evaluate on their 
own and thus must be accurate and reliable in order to foster true 
agency transparency and accountability.  The efficiency principle ac-
knowledges the importance of responsive, timely government.187  This 
is important with respect to decisions based on scientific information 
because scientific inquiries are often complex and aimed at address-
ing time-sensitive issues of public policy.188  It is especially so for edu-
cation policies like the distributive model, which must be imple-
mented so as not to interfere with the structure of individual classes 
or the academic calendar as a whole.  Finally, consistency, the re-
quirement that like cases be treated alike, is a fundamental feature of 
 
Rather, it requires elected officials to make policy decisions because they are sub-
ject to the check of the people if they do not discharge their duties in a sufficiently 
public-regarding and otherwise rational, predictable, and fair manner.  Thus, ac-
countability can be understood to enable voters not only to consider whether 
elected officials have maximized popular preferences in making or executing the 
law, but also, and equally importantly, whether those officials have inappropriately 
favored narrow interests in doing so. 
  Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 117, at 499 (citing Rebecca L. Brown, Accoun-
tability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 565–71 (1998)); see also 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 183, at 187 (“The principle of political accountability has an unmis-
takable foundation in Article I of the Constitution, and it is an overriding structural 
commitment of the document.  The principle has foundations as well in assessments of 
institutional performance.  At the same time, it operates to counteract characteristic fail-
ures in the regulatory process.”); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 94 (“Accountability 
and avoidance of factionalism, then, are two central values of the framers’ original execu-
tive.”); id. at 119 (arguing that a unitary executive “fits well with important political and 
constitutional values, including the interests in political accountability”).  See generally Ste-
ven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23 
(1995) (noting the constitutional importance of accountability).  In administrative law, 
this typically involves voters expressing their dissatisfaction with elected officials who sup-
ported particular administrators. 
187 Glen O. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:  Another Look at Rulemaking and Ad-
judication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 516 (1970) (“The 
goal of efficiency needs no explanation or defense.  If it cannot be considered an ulti-
mate concern of administrative law that tasks be accomplished with the minimum ex-
penditure of time and resources, it is nevertheless a matter of large importance.”). 
188 See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH:  SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 77–78 
(1990); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1, 30–31 (2006) (“Indeed, the deadlines . . . frequently placed on agency decisionmaking 
acknowledge the pressing need in many cases to intervene on policy problems.  Agencies 
already have difficulty meeting those deadlines . . . .”). 
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rational decision making, impartiality, and fairness, and in turn is es-
sential to administrative legitimacy.189 
Considered against the backdrop of these principles, the distribu-
tive model demonstrates significant weaknesses.  The most obvious 
and oft-discussed is the problem of agency expertise.  The over-
whelming majority of current scientific experts support Darwinism as 
the only scientifically sound explanation of human origins,190 and op-
ponents of evolution instruction have yet to present an alternative to 
Darwinism that survives scrutiny under the scientific method.191  Re-
 
189 Professor Dotan described the impact of consistency on administrative legitimacy as fol-
lows: 
The requirement of consistency . . . that like cases be treated alike—is fundamen-
tal both for bureaucratic decisionmaking and for legal systems at large.  It has 
strong intuitive appeal to our sense of justice, and is intertwined with the notion of 
fairness.  It is a due process value.  It is fundamental to the notions of prompt ad-
ministrative order, rationality in administrative decisionmaking, and impartiality in 
adjudicative proceedings.  Under the idea of the rule of law, administrative deci-
sions are expected to be made with reference to a system of clearly stated, pre-
viously established, and publicly promulgated set of legal rules and principles—in 
a fashion that preserves the coherence and predictability of the process of deci-
sionmaking.  Inconsistency in administrative decisionmaking (that is, where agen-
cies fail to treat similar cases alike) defies the values of the rule of law.  Such in-
consistency may signal serious flaws in the administrative process and provide 
several grounds for judicial intervention to rectify such flaws.  Inconsistent admin-
istrative decisions may point to improper motives on behalf of the decisionmaker, 
discriminatory bias in favor or against some participants, or, at the very least, a lack 
of proper management and coherent implementation of agency law.  There is 
hardly any more suitable reason to label the administrative process as ‘arbitrary 
and capricious’ than in the case of a process that treats like cases differently.  In 
addition, consistency in decisionmaking serves as a vital precondition for guaran-
teeing public faith in government.  Finally, consistency in administrative deci-
sionmaking is congruent with the need to protect reasonable expectations and re-
liance interests on behalf of the members of the public. 
  Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1000–01 (2005); see also 
Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1105 (1984) 
(“Nothing leaves a state agent as much room for venality, hatred, caprice, or carelessness 
as the power to ignore the applicable rules.”). 
190 Richard O’Grady, the Executive Director of the American Institute of Biological Sciences, 
made this point in a letter objecting to the Louisiana Science Education Act: 
The scientific community has long ago reached consensus on evolution.  Scientists 
from many fields of study agree that evolutionary processes are the accepted scien-
tific explanation for the history and diversity of life on Earth.  Evolu-
tion . . . developed through a rigorous scientific process . . . . Scientific scrutiny has 
not disproved the theory of evolution . . . it has strengthened and refined the 
theory . . . . 
  Letter from Richard O’ Grady, PhD., Exec. Dir., Am. Inst. of Biological Scis. to Members 
of the Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ. (June 4, 2009), http://
www.aibs.org/position-statements/20090604_aibs_submits_co_1.html; see Letter from Ri-
chard O’Grady, PhD., Exec. Dir., Am. Inst. of Biological Scis. to La. State Representatives, 
supra note 97 (“Supernatural explanations for [evolution] are not scientifically testable 
and are not science.”). 
191 This is perhaps most evident in the policy move by antievolutionists from intelligent de-
sign to the distributive model, which focuses not on presenting alternatives per se, but in-
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gardless of whether a scientific revolution is on the horizon, the 
scientific debate about human origins does not appear sufficiently 
robust in its current form to legitimize a policy decision based on en-
couraging students to confront that very debate in public school 
science classes.192 
With this expertise problem comes a corresponding accountability 
issue.  By relying on the existence of a scientific controversy over evo-
lution to support the distributive model, policy makers leave the lay 
public with little choice but to evaluate the merits of the decision on 
the policy makers’ own scientific terms; the public must either accept 
that a scientific dispute about evolution exists or engage the scientific 
issue on their own.  In neither case are policy makers accountable for 
their decision, as the public is forced to either accept at face value the 
existence of a scientific controversy involving evolution and, in turn, 
the legitimacy of the distributive model, or to engage in an indepen-
dent scientific investigation of the matter that is likely beyond its 
technical competence. 
In short, the political legitimacy of the distributive model depends 
in no small part on the accuracy and reliability of the scientific in-
formation and conclusions used to inform that policy decision.193  
This in turn raises questions about how to best promote scientific 
quality in decisions about science education.  A widely-used and pop-
ular approach to dealing with scientific reliability issues related to 
policy making is the use of independent peer review.194  Peer review 
involves the consideration by independent experts in the relevant 
 
stead on introducing students to a wide range of views about evolution.  See MODEL 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM STATUTE ON EVOLUTION, supra note 84, § 3 (providing that teachers 
in elementary and secondary schools “shall have the affirmative right and freedom to 
present scientific information pertaining to the full range of scientific views regarding bi-
ological and chemical evolution”). 
192 The analysis may very well be different where the controversy over evolution is presented 
in non-science classes, see Wexler, supra note 5, at 787, but that is not the goal of the dis-
tributive model or its supporters; the model is specifically targeted at finding ways to in-
troduce uncertainty about evolution into science instruction.  See, e.g., Louisiana Science 
Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1) (2008) (focusing on promoting criti-
cal thinking in science classes, in particular with regard to “scientific theo-
ries . . . including . . . evolution, the origins of life, global warming, and human cloning”). 
193 See Louis J. Virelli III, Scientific Peer Review and Administrative Legitimacy, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 
723, 754–56 (2009) [hereinafter Virelli, Scientific Peer Review] (discussing how reliable 
scientific information is crucial to ensuring the expertise necessary to foster legitimacy in 
agency policy decisions). 
194 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-99, FEDERAL RESEARCH:  PEER 
REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY 18–70 (1999) [hereinafter GAO 
PEER REVIEW REPORT] (describing varying peer review practices at twelve federal agen-
cies); Jasanoff, supra note 188, at 84–180 (describing scientific advisory processes of the 
EPA and FDA). 
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field of the scientific “inputs” on which the policy—in this case the 
distributive model—is based.195  In addition to questions of peer re-
view’s general utility in this context, there are related issues of what 
form of peer review is best suited to promote scientific accuracy and 
reliability in evolution instruction policy.196 
In cases where the political position at issue was a decision by an 
individual educator as to how to approach the evolution debate in 
the classroom, questions of scientific reliability and accuracy are 
equally important, but the second-order issues of how to address the 
problem change.  Rather than using scientific peer review to evaluate 
each individual decision by an educator, legitimacy issues at that level 
may necessitate additional policy measures requiring specific training 
either in the details of the scientific controversy, the legal limitations 
on classroom dialogue about topics like creationism, or both.  With-
out these protective measures, scientific reliability and accuracy could 
suffer in ways that may bring the legitimacy of the entire distributive 
model into question. 
In addition to problems centered on scientific reliability and ac-
curacy, there are accountability concerns arising from the distributive 
model’s procedural regime that pose potential problems for its legi-
timacy.  While the drafters of the model’s statutory or regulatory 
framework may be elected officials197 who are operating under proce-
dural requirements to ensure transparency and public participation 
in the drafting process, the final decision regarding how to teach the 
concept of human origins is left to individual teachers in individual 
classrooms.198  The distributive model does not include any generally-
 
195 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing the Right Dose of Peer Review for the Endangered Species Act, 83 
NEB. L. REV. 398, 402 (2004) (“Peer review is generally described as a scientifically rigor-
ous review and critique of a study’s methods, results, and findings that is conducted by 
others in the relevant field who have the requisite training and expertise, who have no 
pecuniary or other disqualifying bias with respect to the topic, and who are independent 
of the persons who performed the study.”); see also GAO PEER REVIEW REPORT 4 (explain-
ing that although there is “no written definition of peer review that applies across the 
federal government . . . all of the agencies’ definitions . . . contained the fundamental 
concept of a review of technical or scientific merit by individuals with sufficient technical 
competence and no unresolved conflict of interest.”). 
196 Even where peer review programs exist to support science education policy, questions of 
how peer review should be employed remain highly relevant to the broader question of 
the policy’s political legitimacy.  See generally Virelli, Scientific Peer Review, supra note 193. 
197 See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 373 (explaining that some state constitutions ex-
pressly create administrative agencies or allow for the direct election of administrators). 
198 See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) (2008) 
(stating that the State Board of Education “shall allow and assist teachers . . . to create and 
foster an environment . . . that promotes critical thinking . . . of scientific theories,” in-
cluding offering “support and guidance” for those efforts (emphasis added)). 
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applicable guidelines for how teachers should approach the topic of 
evolution instruction, and for reasons motivated by judicial treat-
ments of previous evolution instruction policies under the Establish-
ment Clause, such generally-applicable statements by lawmakers are 
no longer considered a viable part of antievolutionist policy.199 
The result is that the accountability of policy makers under the 
distributive model is lacking in two ways.  The first is their public ac-
countability prior to making a decision about evolution instruction.  
Even before confronting an evolution issue in the classroom, the 
principle of accountability requires that the inputs of educators into 
the policy-making process be transparent to the public.  These inputs 
would include whatever sources of information and knowledge each 
individual educator may have that is germane to their decision mak-
ing regarding evolution instruction.  Under the distributive model, 
however, teacher training and knowledge relevant to the problem is, 
at best, unclear.  Public training programs will almost certainly not be 
available, as they would run afoul of the very purpose of the distribu-
tive model—to enable criticism of evolutionary theory within public 
school science classes without taking any specific position as to how 
human origins must or should be taught.200  Without such training, 
any representations about teachers’ personal understanding of the 
relevant legal issues should be viewed skeptically.  It is unrealistic to 
think that elementary and secondary education science teachers can 
become experts in the constitutional issues surrounding evolution in-
struction even with, let alone without, some measure of formal train-
ing in the area.  As a result, pre-decisional accountability is lacking 
from the distributive model. 
Post-decisional accountability is no more prevalent.  Decisions 
about how to treat the controversy over evolution instruction are 
made on an ad hoc basis under the distributive model by educators 
who are not obligated to record or report their decisions and whose 
only audience is a classroom of children.  Although a particularly di-
ligent constituency could seek ways to make a classroom more open 
to the public, or at least to the students’ guardians, there are no 
guarantees that this approach would provide an accurate or adequate 
account of classroom conduct, nor is it without negative educational 
consequences.  Relying on the diligence of the local community 
 
199 See discussion supra Part II (describing the movement in antievolutionist policy away from 
legislative proscriptions regarding evolution in response to federal court rulings invalidat-
ing these policy measures under the Establishment Clause); see also discussion supra note 
111 and accompanying text. 
200 See discussion supra Part II. 
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without government mandates supporting transparency is not only 
unreliable as a means of classroom monitoring, but may lead to nega-
tive pedagogical consequences that either diminish or outweigh the 
benefits of teachers being made more accountable.  In sum, accoun-
tability is a problem under the distributive model and is only made 
readily apparent by viewing evolution instruction as a challenge to be 
addressed by reference to administrative law principles. 
The third consideration pertaining to political legitimacy, effi-
ciency, is less of a concern for the distributive model, but may still 
prove problematic.  By empowering individual educators to make de-
cisions about evolution instruction in real time, the distributive mod-
el is potentially as efficient as fact-specific policy making could con-
ceivably be.  To the extent each issue pertaining to the teaching of 
evolution that arises in a science classroom is unique, then transfer-
ring authority to decision makers who are intimately familiar with the 
issue is a highly efficient way to address the problem.  Where issues 
begin to recur, however, inconsistent decisions could create problems 
for the efficient operation of the entire policy-making regime.  In-
consistent results could lead to confusion among the teachers as well 
as information contamination from students across classrooms that 
could frustrate the educational effectiveness of not only the model, 
but of the science class as a whole.201  Where the distributive model 
threatens its own consistency, it likewise threatens its ability to func-
tion efficiently and, in turn, legitimately. 
Consistent decision making within the distributive model is a 
foundational feature of its legitimacy independent from its effect on 
administrative efficiency.202  Absent some attempt to unify educators’ 
approach to deciding questions of evolution instruction—an ap-
proach that the distributive model seeks to avoid for constitutional 
reasons203—there are no safeguards within the distributive model to 
ensure even a threshold level of consistency in those decisions.  The 
 
201 Intra-classroom uniformity is preferred because the prospect of some students in a class-
room being taught something substantively different about human origins than other 
students in the same classroom could lead, at a minimum, to a pedagogically absurd re-
sult. 
202 See Dotan, supra note 189, at 1000–01 (describing the impact of consistency on adminis-
trative legitimacy); Krent, supra note 183, at 1212 (“First, when agencies have limited 
their own discretion, review can help ensure that the agency treat similarly situated indi-
viduals equivalently, a fundamental principle of public law.  Review for consistency furth-
ers the ideal of agency legitimacy.”). 
203 See discussion supra Part II (describing the movement in antievolutionist policy away from 
explicit treatment of religion in response to federal court rulings invalidating these policy 
measures under the Establishment Clause); see also discussion supra note 111 and accom-
panying text. 
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distributive model is premised on the transfer of authority over evolu-
tion instruction directly to the classroom level, without any guiding 
principle beyond the desire to promote “critical thinking” about the 
sciences.204  Unless a rational (i.e., legitimizing) explanation can be 
provided for why a potentially random series of pedagogical choices 
is desirable, a lack of decisional consistency threatens the model’s 
viability. 
These potential difficulties with the political legitimacy of the dis-
tributive model highlight the importance of adopting an administra-
tive perspective in evaluating the model.  The application of adminis-
trative law principles increases the likelihood that questions of 
legitimacy will be included within the analysis of the distributive 
model in the first instance, and provides a useful platform from 
which to guide the development of evolution education policy as it 
moves beyond the blunt approach of Establishment Clause chal-
lenges. 
B.  Additional Questions 
There are a number of other important issues triggered by the 
decision to view the distributive model in light of administrative law 
principles.  Although none of these is as foundational as the question 
of political legitimacy, each provides fuel for future discussion 
grounded in the understanding that the distributive model cannot be 
adequately evaluated, as its predecessors were, solely under the Estab-
lishment Clause. 
1. Judicial Review 
Viewing the distributive model from an administrative vantage 
point raises important questions about its treatment in the courts.  
Administrative pronouncements are subject to a complex system of 
judicial review in which agency determinations of law, fact, and policy 
 
204 See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) (2008) 
(stating that the State Board of Education “shall allow and assist teachers . . . to create and 
foster an environment . . . that promotes critical thinking . . . of scientific theories,” in-
cluding offering “support and guidance” for those efforts (emphasis added)); see also su-
pra note 80 (discussing the importance of individual teachers, rather than administrative 
entities such as school boards, acting as policy makers under the distributive model). 
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are all subject to standards of review that are potentially different 
from one another and from their counterparts in Article III courts.205 
The most important of these standards for the distributive model 
is the arbitrary and capricious (or abuse of discretion) standard.206  
The distributive model’s most controversial feature is its grant of 
power to individual teachers to exercise their discretion in promoting 
critical thinking about the sciences.  More precisely, the features of 
the distributive model most likely to be challenged are the higher-
level statutory or regulatory decisions to promote critical thinking 
about evolution in science classes and the second-order decisions of 
individual teachers as to how to achieve that goal in the classroom.  
Neither of these determinations will likely raise purely legal issues 
(other than Establishment Clause challenges, which are subject to de 
novo review),207 as the model’s statutory or regulatory framework gives 
teachers wide latitude to promote critical thinking about evolution.208  
 
205 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.  But see David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 
VA. L. REV. 135 (2010) (arguing that judicial review of administrative actions is better de-
scribed and performed through a reasonableness standard). 
206 ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 567 (describing the arbitrary and capricious and 
abuse of discretion standards as “interchangeable”); see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (“Section 706(2)(A) requires a finding that the ac-
tual choice made was not ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.’  To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment.” (citation omitted)); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (originally encated 
as Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237) (describing the standards 
of review under the federal Administrative Procedure Act); MODEL STATE ADMIN. 
PROCEDURE ACT § 15 (“The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the agency] 
if . . . the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are . . . arbitrary or 
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of dis-
cretion.”).  “[T]he [administrative procedure] acts of most states are based on the 1961 
MSAPA.”  Bonfield, supra note 149, at 123 n. 5. 
207 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (requiring courts to overturn “agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be—contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immuni-
ty”). 
208 In cases where a student does challenge either the regulatory structure of the distributive 
model as outside its statutory mandate or a decision by an individual teacher on the 
grounds that it is not permitted by the governing statute or regulation, different ques-
tions of judicial review may arise.  See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (outlining a two-step test for judicial review of an 
agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute in a rulemaking proceeding); ASIMOW & 
LEVIN, supra note 118, at 526–27 (providing an overview of state law dealing with judicial 
review of agency interpretations of statutes, and stating that most states employ a less de-
ferential approach to administrative interpretations of statutes than was prescribed for 
federal courts in Chevron); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (ad-
dressing the question of judicial review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute in the 
context of an informal adjudication); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (holding that 
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation in an informal adjudication deserves 
judicial deference). 
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Regardless of whether they are treated as factual or policy-related, 
each of these determinations is subject to arbitrary and capricious re-
view.209  As a result, the distributive model will most likely be chal-
lenged on grounds that require judicial scrutiny under the arbitrary 
or capricious standard.210 
The impact of arbitrary and capricious review on the distributive 
model could be felt on at least two levels.  First is the consideration of 
the model’s broader policy objective of promoting critical thinking 
about evolution in science classes.211  As an initial matter, where this 
broader statement takes the form of a statute, arbitrary and capri-
cious review will likely not apply, as legislative policy choices are tradi-
 
209 The arbitrary and capricious standard may be applied to review agency findings of fact in 
informal proceedings, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (reviewing a regulation promulgated by informal rulemaking 
procedures under the arbitrary and capricious standard), and is largely indistinguishable 
from the substantial evidence standard used to review fact finding in formal adjudica-
tions.  See also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 745 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (downplaying the distinction between “substantial evi-
dence” and “arbitrary and capricious” review of agency fact-finding); ASIMOW & LEVIN, su-
pra note 118, at 567.  In the case of the distributive model, then, the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard is most significant because it applies not only to policy determinations 
associated with the model, but to challenges based on fact finding by the agency in draft-
ing the model’s regulatory framework. 
210 Arbitrary and capricious review may not be the only standard, however, that will impact 
the distributive model.  As discussed supra at note 208, different questions of judicial re-
view may arise, for example, in cases where a student challenges either the regulatory 
structure of the distributive model as outside its statutory mandate, or a decision by an 
individual teacher on the grounds that it is not permitted by the governing statute or 
regulation.  Moreover, there is a remote possibility that an individual teacher’s authority 
under the distributive model could be interpreted to be so broadly discretionary as to lie 
outside the realm of judicial review altogether.  See 5 U.S.C. § 701(2) (exempting from 
judicial review agency actions “committed to agency discretion by law”).  But see Webster 
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (explaining that agency administrative action is only un-
reviewable on the basis that it has been committed to agency discretion where the “statute 
is drawn [so that a] court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the 
agency’s exercise of discretion”); ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 634 (describing 
state law on whether a decision is committed to agency discretion as reflecting “many of 
the same tensions that appear in federal cases”).  In the case of the distributive model, 
the stated purpose to promote critical thinking, although a broad grant of discretion, is 
not so subjective as to be immune from meaningful judicial review. 
   Regardless of the precise standards that would apply in every conceivable challenge 
to the distributive model, it is sufficient for purposes of this discussion to highlight two 
facts pertaining to the distributive model and judicial review.  First is that policy and/or 
factual decisions by administrators and individual teachers under the model are likely to 
be subject to arbitrary and capricious review.  Second is that judicial review presents im-
portant issues for the distributive model, and that these important questions of judicial 
review are only made apparent when the model is considered in connection with prin-
ciples of administrative law. 
211 See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) 
(2008). 
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tionally not subject to judicial review.212  Where the same statement 
originates or, as in Louisiana, is essentially duplicated in an adminis-
trative regulation,213 judicial review as understood in the administra-
tive context—including arbitrary and capricious review—applies.214  
In those cases, although still not likely to run afoul of the arbitrary 
and capricious standard, it is possible that a reviewing court could 
conclude that the current state of scientific thought is not adequately 
balanced on both sides of the evolution debate to justify the promo-
tion of “critical thinking” about the subject at the elementary and 
secondary education levels.215 
 
212 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 
116 (1998) (“[A]t least under classical schools of interpretation, courts deciding statutory 
cases are bound to follow commands and policies embodied in the enacted text—
commands and policies that the courts did not create and cannot change.”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term—Foreword:  The Court and the Economic System, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) (“Judges must be honest agents of the political branches.  
They carry out decisions they do not make.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent 
conception of the role of the courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or ser-
vants of the legislature. . . . The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by 
others, most notably the legislature.”). 
213 See Bulletin 741-Louisiana Handbook for School Administrators, Curriculum and Instruc-
tion, Science Education, 35:8 La. Reg. 1476 (Aug. 20, 2009). 
214 As discussed supra note 210, review of a regulation employing the higher-level policy 
statements of the distributive model will also be available for its compliance with the sta-
tutory mandate that empowered the rulemaking in the first place.  As an initial matter, 
this is a very different question on judicial review than the question of whether the policy 
decision to encourage critical thinking about evolution is arbitrary and capricious; the is-
sue of whether the agency enacted a rule within its statutory mandate depends on the 
specific language of the statute as well as the reasonableness of the agency’s interpreta-
tion of the statutory language.  See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Moreover, as a practical matter, in instances in which the dis-
tributive model has originated as a statute—like Louisiana’s Science Education Act, for 
instance—the language of the statute and regulation have been nearly identical, thereby 
making clear that the regulation is within statutory boundaries.  See 35:8 La. Reg. 1476. 
215 This represents an additional, but slightly different, evaluation of the scientific underpin-
nings of evolution than that employed in the analysis of the distributive model’s political 
legitimacy.  See discussion supra Part V.A. 
   It is far less objectionable to focus on scientific debates that may, like evolution, ap-
pear one-sided with more sophisticated audiences at, for example, the collegiate or grad-
uate level.  But where elementary and secondary school students are involved, there is a 
strong argument for avoiding discussions of controversies outside the scientific main-
stream for fear of confusing students without the educational tools or experience to 
process conflicting information.  A study of critical thinking among college and graduate 
students indicates a similar conclusion with regard to post-secondary students, let alone 
elementary and high school students: 
The college seniors . . . did not consistently base their arguments on evidence and 
did not demonstrate an understanding of the role of evidence in making interpre-
tations and judgments.  Their . . . assumption [was] that because there are many 
possible answers to every question and no absolutely certain way to adjudicate be-
tween competing answers, knowledge claims are simply idiosyncratic to the indi-
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A far greater potential problem created by arbitrary and capri-
cious review of the distributive model is the impact of judicial scrutiny 
on the model’s choice to empower individual educators in individual 
classrooms to make decisions regarding how to teach evolution.216  
While there is nothing inherently arbitrary or capricious about these 
decisions, it is unlikely that there will be any administrative record or 
other documentation supporting each individual educator’s deter-
mination, thereby making such decisions increasingly vulnerable to 
arbitrariness review.217  Moreover, the sheer magnitude and variety of 
these decisions invites significant intrusion by the judiciary into the 
daily operations of public school science classes.  This intrusion could 
not only cause profound confusion among teachers and students, but 
may also prove to have little benefit to the participants, as students 
who have been exposed to an unprincipled account of the scientific 
underpinnings of human origins may or may not be present to expe-
rience the effects of a judicial remedy.  Finally, from a wider political 
perspective, the threat of legal challenges to specific decisions may 
cause teachers to refrain from pursuing the model’s mandate alto-
gether.  In short, viewing the distributive model as an administrative 
enactment reveals issues pertaining to judicial review of the model 
that are important to its effectiveness and viability, and that are not 
readily apparent when the model is perceived solely in the Establish-
ment Clause context. 
2. Delegation 
Delegation is a concept that is most prevalent in administrative 
law, but is founded on constitutional concerns.  In order to accom-
 
vidual.  In other words, an answer to an ill-structured problem is seen as merely an 
opinion. . . .  The graduate students . . . also fell short . . . .  The logic at this stage 
is that different perspectives (e.g., different academic disciplines) have different 
rules of inquiry and thus yield different but equally legitimate interpretations.  Be-
liefs are strictly relative to a particular perspective.  Students holding these as-
sumptions often cannot identify criteria by which to judge one interpretation as 
being more adequate or useful than another. 
  Patricia M. King et al., Critical Thinking Among College and Graduate Students, 13 REV. OF 
HIGHER EDUC. 167, 179 (1990). 
216 See discussion supra note 80 (explaining why the distributive model shifts policy-making 
authority to individual teachers rather than, for example, administrative agencies like 
school boards). 
217 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (conclud-
ing that arbitrariness review required judicial consideration of the “full administrative 
record” before the agency at the time of its decision, and that if the “bare record” did not 
“disclose the factors that were considered” by the agency in rendering its decision, “it may 
be necessary for the District Court to require some explanation”). 
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modate the expansion of administrative government, courts on both 
the state and federal level have developed delegation doctrines de-
signed to set standards for determining when a transfer of power 
from a constitutionally-mandated branch of government to an admin-
istrative agency exceeds the boundaries set by the principle of separa-
tion of powers.218  This is an important question for the distributive 
model because one of its most powerful policy features—and a strong 
source of its appeal to antievolutionists219—is derived from its delega-
tion of policy-making authority from legislators or traditional regula-
tors to individual educators. 
To the extent that the model delegates primarily adjudicative220 
power to public school teachers, it raises questions about whether 
those teachers’ decisions about evolution instruction must be 
brought, as a constitutional matter, in the courts.  Because the cur-
rent form of the distributive model employs informal adjudication, 
rather than trial-like adversarial proceedings to set evolution instruc-
tion policy,221 neither federal nor state law in the area points to a se-
rious concern about the delegation of judicial power.222 
If the distributive model is treated as a legislative delegation,223 a 
different analysis is required.  At the federal level, the legislative non-
delegation doctrine has been interpreted exceedingly broadly, per-
mitting delegations to agencies in every instance in which Congress 
has articulated an “intelligible principle” to guide those agencies in 
exercising their newly-acquired discretion.224  The Court has applied 
the intelligible principle standard equally broadly, causing some to 
 
218 See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, at 374 (“The [legislative] nondelegation doctrine 
invokes both separation of powers and checks and balances arguments.”).  Some state 
constitutions expressly create administrative agencies or allow for the direct election of 
administrators.  In these instances, delegation is far less of a concern, if at all.  See id. at 
373. 
219 See discussion supra note 80 (explaining the importance to the distributive model of using 
individual teachers as policy makers). 
220 For a discussion of the adjudicative and regulatory features of the distributive model, see 
supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text. 
221 See discussion supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text (discussing the adjudicative fea-
tures of the distributive model). 
222 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834–35 (1986) 
(outlining the relevant factors in evaluating whether agency adjudication unconstitution-
ally interferes with the operation of the federal courts); ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 118, 
at 404 (addressing state law doctrine of adjudicative delegation). 
223 See discussion supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text. 
224 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2000) (applying the intellig-
ible principle standard to uphold an air quality standard promulgated by the EPA against 
a delegation challenge). 
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describe the federal delegation doctrine as virtually a dead letter.225  
Individual states, however, have been much more restrictive in per-
mitting legislative delegation.226  While the distributive model’s stated 
goal of promoting critical thinking appears adequate to meet the 
federal standard, the model is much more likely to be enacted at the 
state level, where the wider variation of standards and attitudes about 
delegation increases the possibility that legitimate questions will arise 
concerning the model’s delegation of power. 
Even if the distributive model does not run afoul of existing state 
or federal delegation doctrine, delegation offers a unique and useful 
window into the distributive model.  In a case like the distributive 
model where delegation is such a critical feature of the policy, it is 
useful to maintain a perspective that encourages the ongoing consid-
eration of the role that delegation plays in the model.  Perhaps even 
more important, however, is the fact that continuing to focus on the 
distributive model’s delegation of power to individual educators high-
lights still more important questions that may otherwise have been 
overlooked. 
a. Procedural Due Process 
The distributive model’s delegation of authority to individual 
teachers sheds light on the possible relevance of another constitu-
tional issue—whether students’ and/or parents’ procedural due 
 
225 See David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle That Elected Legislators Should Make the Laws, 
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 249 (2003) (describing Whitman v. American Trucking 
Ass’ns as “seeming to foreswear any intention to block delegation to administrative agen-
cies”); id. at 250 (“One way to read the modern delegation cases is that the delegation 
doctrine is now only a ghost.”); see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 192 
(1943) (holding that the Communications Act of 1934 was not an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative authority because its instructions to the Federal Communications 
Commission to act in the “public interest, convenience, or necessity” constituted a consti-
tutional intelligible principle); Richard W. Murphy, Separation Of Powers and the Horizontal 
Force of Precedent, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1083 (2003) (“The courts have . . . ceded 
almost plenary authority to Congress to delegate as much discretionary power as it sees 
fit.  The nondelegation doctrine’s current, dead-letter form suggests that it would be al-
most impossible for Congress to grant the courts an unconstitutional amount of pow-
er . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
226 See Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards:  A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 578 (1994) (“The state supreme courts historically have used the 
delegation doctrine to a greater extent than the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down legis-
lative delegations of power.  Traditionally, while the federal government almost always 
has found broad delegations constitutional, the state courts have upheld broad delega-
tions of power more reluctantly.” (citations omitted)); see also ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 
118, at 391 (“The nondelegation doctrine has much greater practical significance at the 
state level than at the federal level.”). 
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process rights have been violated by an educator’s decision to present 
information that is critical of, or constitutes an alternative to, evolu-
tion.227  The distributive model is at least potentially understood as an 
adjudicative policy-making regime;228 it empowers individual educa-
tors to make contemporaneous decisions about what it means to 
think critically about evolution and how to introduce students to this 
critical approach.229 
This adjudicative feature of the model implicates procedural due 
process protections—the right to be notified and heard before being 
deprived of a constitutionally-protected interest230—that do not exist 
in a legislative or rule-making context.231  The Court in Mathews v. El-
dridge232 articulated a three-part test for determining whether proce-
dural due process requirements are met.  The Mathews test weighs the 
individual’s protected interest against the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of that interest and the government’s interest in maintaining the 
existing procedural regime.233  Under that test, the distributive model 
appears to trigger some significant due process concerns.  For exam-
ple, any decision by a teacher to engage the evolution debate by ref-
erence to the biblical or any other religiously-based explanation of 
human origins could trigger the students’ First Amendment liberty 
interest in being free from government establishment of religion.234  
 
227 This issue was addressed in greater detail in an earlier publication by the author.  See 
Louis J. Virelli III, Evolutionary Due Process, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 251 (2010), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/2/LRColl2010n2
Virelli.pdf. 
228 For a more detailed explanation of the distributive model’s adjudicative features, see supra 
notes 145–50 and accompanying text. 
229 See supra Part III (describing the distributive model). 
230 “For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear:  
‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they 
may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’”  Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 
(1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863)). 
231 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) (distinguish-
ing between legislative conduct and that in which a “relatively small number of persons 
was concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds, 
and it was held that they had a right to hearing.”). 
232 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
233 See id. 
234 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 (1977) (defining a “liberty interest” under 
procedural due process as, inter alia, any “interest within the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the Estab-
lishment Clause into the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment).  It is important to 
remember that the presence of a constitutionally-protected interest does not mean that a 
constitutional violation has occurred.  As discussed supra Part IV.C, the facially-neutral 
and indeterminate nature of the distributive model renders it more difficult to evaluate 
(and thus invalidate) under the Establishment Clause.  That does not mean, however, 
that Establishment Clause challenges to the distributive model or its implementation by 
 
140 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:1 
 
Moreover, when the decision as to how to engage the evolution de-
bate is made by individual teachers, the risk of erroneous deprivation 
of that interest is significant; individuals who are untrained in the 
Constitution and are asked to make contemporaneous decisions 
about how to address questions of evolution instruction are highly 
likely to overstep their constitutional bounds without the presence of 
procedural protections.235  Finally, the government has little if any in-
terest in allowing these decisions to be made without any process.236  
The distributive model is generally silent with regard to how a stu-
dent or parent may pursue an Establishment Clause challenge to an 
educator’s approach to evolution instruction,237 and there is no ob-
vious reason why such decisions must be made quickly and without 
prior deliberation.  Delaying a teacher’s treatment of the evolution 
debate may be inconvenient in terms of the lesson plan for that class 
and may pose additional administrative costs,238 but when weighed 
against the students’ liberty interests and the high probability that 
those interests will be threatened without additional process, at least 
some opportunity for pre-decisional legal process in the form of no-
tice and a hearing is constitutionally required. 
The likelihood of success of due process challenges to educational 
decisions under the distributive model, in conjunction with the facts 
that such challenges are available to students every time an educator 
chooses to engage the evolution debate and that even a successful de-
fense does not insulate a school or educator against a subsequent Es-
 
individual educators will cease, nor does it say anything about whether those challenges—
meritorious or not—are constitutionally entitled to some measure of process beyond what 
the school or school district has already made available. 
235 See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 (“Central to the evaluation of any administrative process 
is the nature of the relevant inquiry.”); id. at 343–44 (finding additional procedural pro-
tections necessary where “a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and is-
sues of witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking process”). 
236 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential prin-
ciple of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by no-
tice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” (quoting Mul-
lane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950))). 
237 The regulations accompanying the Louisiana Science Education Act make some provi-
sions for challenging the use of supplemental materials by science teachers, but are silent 
with regard to what process is available for students or parents challenging a teacher’s 
classroom presentation about evolution.  Bulletin 741-Louisiana Handbook for School 
Administrators, Curriculum and Instruction, Science Education, 35:8 La. Reg. 1477 (Aug. 
20, 2009) (outlining procedures by which “[a]ny Louisiana citizen may challenge [sup-
plemental] materials used” to teach about human origins). 
238 See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347 (“In striking the appropriate due process balance the 
final factor to be assessed is the public interest.  This includes the administrative burden 
and other societal costs that would be associated with requiring, as a matter of constitu-
tional right, [additional procedures].”). 
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tablishment Clause or other substantive action, may deter educators 
from engaging in a scientific critique of evolution where the possibili-
ty of only a substantive challenge would not.  At minimum, acknowl-
edging the distributive model’s relationship with administrative law 
principles is significant because it highlights the importance of the 
model’s delegation of decisional authority to individual educators, 
which in turn exposes the specter of procedural due process chal-
lenges to the exercise of that authority. 
b. Municipal Liability and Qualified Immunity 
The delegation of policy-making in the distributive model could 
also have consequences in civil rights suits against individual educa-
tors and school boards relating to the teaching of evolution.  Because 
the distributive model delegates policy-making authority to individual 
teachers in individual classrooms, as opposed to school boards or leg-
islatures,239 the model could place teachers and their municipal em-
ployers in an unusual and potentially detrimental position.  Govern-
ment officials generally retain qualified immunity in suits against 
them (personally or in their official capacity) for damages.240  Quali-
fied immunity applies where an official did not violate any “clearly es-
tablished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable per-
son would have known.”241  There is no reason to believe that the 
standard or its application to individual teachers will change based on 
whether the teacher is acting under the distributive model or some 
other evolution instruction policy; if a teacher violates a student’s 
rights under the Establishment Clause, she runs the risk of being lia-
ble to that student for equitable relief and damages, regardless of the 
educational policy regime they are operating within. 
 
239 See discussion supra note 80 (explaining the importance to the distributive model of using 
individual teachers as policy makers). 
240 Injunctive relief is also available in these cases and, in many instances, may be a more 
common remedy for Establishment Clause violations, but damages are nonetheless a via-
ble remedy under § 1983, see, e.g., Pierce ex rel. Pierce v. Sullivan W. Cent. Sch. Dist., 379 
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2004) (deciding claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged 
Establishment Clause violations), and are a more compelling topic for discussion in rela-
tion to the distributive model.  In cases under the distributive model, where the violation 
takes the form of a specific decision by an individual teacher, the value of injunctive relief 
may be seriously compromised; once a teacher has engaged in certain conduct, an order 
preventing her from repeating that conduct does little to erase existing damage.  For that 
reason, and because damage claims are more limited in § 1983 suits than equitable re-
medies, this discussion focuses on damage claims against teachers or school boards based 
on conduct performed under the distributive model. 
241 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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The analysis becomes very different, however, when we consider 
municipal liability for the conduct of a teacher under the distributive 
model.  Municipalities are largely immune from claims based on al-
leged violations by municipal employees.242  Teachers’ status as policy 
makers under the distributive model, however, could dramatically 
change the scope of their municipal employers’ (school board’s) 
immunity.  Municipalities are not immune from allegedly unconstitu-
tional conduct that “implements or executes a policy statement, or-
dinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated 
by that body’s officers,”243 regardless of whether the individual em-
ployee qualifies for immunity in her personal capacity.244  Moreover, 
whether a government official is a policy maker is defined by refer-
ence to state law.245  In the case of the distributive model, any alleged 
damage to students246 would be the result of decisions by individual 
teachers, who are not only empowered, but encouraged, to set evolu-
tion instruction policy in their own classrooms.247  By empowering in-
dividual teachers to act as policy makers as a matter of state law, 
school boards may weaken their claims to immunity against suits 
based on a teacher’s conduct under the distributive model.  This 
weakened immunity, in conjunction with the high number of inde-
pendent policy makers acting under the distributive model, greatly 
increases a school board’s exposure to damage suits. 
The distributive model’s policy-making regime also creates a po-
tential immunity problem for school boards in the context of suits for 
a failure to train teachers that, according to the model, are permitted 
 
242 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that municipalities are 
subject to suits for damages only where the alleged violation is the result of a municipal 
policy). 
243 Id. at 690. 
244 See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (finding that a municipality 
cannot assert the good faith of its employees as a grounds for qualified immunity from 
suit under § 1983). 
245 See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (“‘[W]hether a particular offi-
cial has “final policymaking authority” is a question of state law.’” (quoting St. Louis v. 
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,123 (1988))). 
246 Damages may be difficult to prove for an Establishment Clause violation, but that does 
not mean they are unavailable.  See, e.g., Pierce ex rel. Pierce v. Sullivan W. Cent. Sch. Dist., 
379 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2004) (entertaining allegations of damages based on, inter alia, 
humiliation resulting from an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause); Doe v. San-
ta Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 824 (5th Cir. 1999) (requiring a showing of “com-
pensable harm” before damages may be awarded for an Establishment Clause violation). 
247 See, e.g., Louisiana Science Education Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:285.1.B(1), (2) (2008) 
(stating that the State Board of Education “shall allow and assist teachers . . . to create and 
foster an environment . . . that promotes critical thinking . . . of scientific theories,” in-
cluding offering “support and guidance” for those efforts) (emphasis added). 
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to exercise wide discretion in making decisions pertaining to evolu-
tion instruction.  Although suits based on a failure to train require a 
showing that the supervisory body demonstrated deliberate indiffe-
rence to the alleged constitutional harm in its failure to train,248 the 
structure of the distributive model makes this standard relatively easy 
to meet.  The model does not require any training of teachers with 
regard to the evolution debate, but it also specifically avoids provid-
ing any detailed guidance to teachers for the very purpose of encour-
aging independence and maximizing discretion.249  This approach 
looks very much like deliberate indifference and, when coupled with 
the high number of largely unconstrained actors employed through-
out the school system, could lead to a high number of failure to train 
suits against school boards. 
The delegation issue associated with the distributive model is thus 
important not solely because of the significant delegation of power 
employed by the model, but because acknowledging the significance 
of the model’s delegation of power to individual teachers expands 
the landscape against which the model itself may be evaluated.  This 
in turn leads to other questions that, although not exclusive to ad-
ministrative law, are significant to the distributive model’s viability 
and are far more difficult to identify without administrative principles 
guiding the analysis. 
In sum, the political legitimacy of the distributive model and the 
potential impact of judicial review and delegation on the model’s 
function and viability are just a few examples of issues that are not 
readily apparent when the policy is considered from a purely reli-
gious and constitutional vantage point.  By viewing this new genera-
tion of evolution instruction policy in light of administrative law prin-
ciples, we are able to recognize significant questions beyond the 
Establishment Clause issues that have traditionally dominated the 
evolution instruction debate. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The controversy over evolution education in America has focused 
on the potential for religious doctrines and ideas to infiltrate public 
school science classrooms.  More specifically, this debate has concen-
 
248 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“We hold today that the inadequa-
cy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to 
train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police 
come into contact.”). 
249 See discussion supra note 80. 
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trated on whether attempts to curtail or otherwise challenge evolu-
tionary theory in science classrooms constitute an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion under the First Amendment.  Although that 
question is still an important one, as the religious underpinnings of 
the debate are undeniable, recent policy measures surrounding the 
debate—specifically, the distributive model of evolution instruction—
suggest that a broader perspective is necessary to avoid being blinded 
by Establishment Clause concerns to other, potentially more signifi-
cant issues. 
This Article contends that administrative law principles provide a 
more helpful context for evaluating the distributive model.  A pers-
pective rooted in administrative law is broad enough to include in-
quiries about the model’s religious character under the Establish-
ment Clause, while also highlighting other important features of the 
distributive model, such as its status as a scientific policy measure and 
its dynamic use of rulemaking and adjudication.  These other fea-
tures beg critical questions of political legitimacy and separation of 
powers that are beyond the scope of the Establishment Clause.  Only 
through an analytical perspective that appreciates the significance of 
administrative law does the full panoply of issues raised by the distri-
butive model come into view, and is the full range of the model’s 
consequences able to be adequately understood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
